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LOBBYING IN THE SHADOWS: RELIGIOUS INTEREST 





The advent of the new religious institutionalism has brought the 
relationship between religion and the state to the fore once again. Yet, for all 
the talk of the appropriateness of religion–state interactions, scholars have yet 
to examine how it functions. This Article analyzes the critical, yet usually 
invisible, role of “religious interest groups”—lobby groups representing 
religious institutions or individuals—in shaping federal legislation. In recent 
years, religious interest groups have come to dominate political discourse. 
Groups such as Priests for Life, Friends Committee on National Legislation, 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union, and American Jewish Congress have 
entered the political fray to lobby for legislative change that is reflective of 
specific religious values. These religious interest groups collectively spend 
over $350 million every year attempting to entrench religious values into the 
law. These groups have become the primary mechanism for religious 
involvement in federal politics, but, surprisingly, the place and role of these 
groups has yet to be examined by legal scholars. 
This Article shows that the key features of religious interest groups reflect 
significant tensions within the emerging project of religious institutionalism. In 
developing this claim, this Article identifies two benefits claimed to result from 
religious involvement in politics—protecting religious liberty and enhancing 
democratic participation—and demonstrates that in fact these benefits are 
unlikely to result from religious interest group politicking. Instead, the pursuit 
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Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, Paul Horwitz, Gregory Magarian, Caroline Corbin, Fred Gedicks, Barry 
Sullivan, James Nelson, Andrew Koppelman, Jessie Hill, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Jacob Levy, Chris Lund, 
Chad Flanders, Michael Helfand, John Witte, Jr., Monu Bedi, Robert J. Smith, Deborah Tuerkheimer, Allison 
Tirres, Daniel Morales, Max Helveston, and Emily Cauble. Thanks to Katherine Garceau and Andrea Wallace 
for their excellent research assistance. Thanks are also due to the editors at the Emory Law Journal, especially 
Ryan Rummage, Ben Klebanoff, and Jameson Bilsborrow, for their excellent editing and substantive feedback. 
ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/17/2015 8:41 AM 
1042 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1041 
of religiously bound interests as a legislative end results in the religious 
interest being pursued as an end in and of itself, consequently imposing 
significant costs on the values of religious liberty and democracy. Ultimately, 
this Article claims that when considering the place of religion in the political 
process, it is incumbent on scholars to consider both the institutional design 
question of how religious participation in politics is operationalized, as well as 
take into account both the costs and benefits of that involvement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has become par for the course among both politicians and commentators 
that religion does, and should, have a place in the federal legislative process. 
Legislators, executive officials, and other public figures publically proclaim 
the need—and their desire—to “work with religious groups” to enact 
legislation that responds to the needs of religious adherents in the community.
1
 
Within the scholarly community, research on religious groups—that is, the 
study of the place and benefits of religious groups in political life—
overwhelmingly advocates for inclusion of religious viewpoints.
2
 Indeed, the 
idea that religious groups should have a role in the political process has 
intuitive value. By including religious groups in politics and in the shaping of 
 
 1 See, e.g., Liliana Mihuţ, Two Faces of American Pluralism: Political and Religious, J. FOR STUDY 
RELIGIONS & IDEOLOGIES, Winter 2012, at 39, 53 (“Then, in the 2000s, the Christian Coalition helped George 
W. Bush to be elected; consequently, one of the first moves of the new President was to create an Office of 
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives mainly to work with religious groups.”); Laurie Goodstein, Panel 
Wants to End Ban on Church Political Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A13, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/08/15/us/panel-wants-to-end-ban-on-church-political-work.html (discussing Senator 
Charles E. Grassley’s efforts in convening a commission comprised of fourteen evangelical Christian leaders, 
recommending the removal of a 1954 ban disallowing churches and other houses of worship from endorsing 
political candidates through revocation of their tax-exempt status); Top Bishops Fight Birth Control Deal, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 14, 2012, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/top-bishops-fight-birth-
control-deal/ (claiming that New York Archbishop, Timothy Dolan, was holding President Barack Obama to 
his “pledge to work with religious groups” regarding the Affordable Care Act contraception mandate and that 
“he trusted Obama wasn’t anti-religious”); Peter Wallsten & N.C. Aizenman, Republicans Vow to Force 
Repeal of Birth-Control Rule, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2012, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/boehner-vows-congressional-action-to-overturn-obama-administration-rule-on-birth-control/2012/02/ 
08/gIQAfFRczQ_story.html (claiming that President Barack Obama reiterated his “promise[] to work with 
religious groups to address their concerns” in regards to the contraception mandate of the Affordable Care 
Act).  
 2 See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF 
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2, 3 (1977); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC 
SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 145 (2d ed. 1986) (claiming that there is a strong tradition 
of religious argument from “Adams, Tocqueville, Lincoln, and a host of others who understood religiously 
based values as the points of reference for public moral discourse”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 115; David Hollenbach, 
Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 883 (1993); 
Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded from 
Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 644–48 (providing a summary of religions historic 
contributions to the political conversation in the United States); Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on 
Religiously Grounded Morality Is Not Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217, 
233–34 (2001) (summarizing instances of religion’s constructive ethical contributions throughout U.S. 
history).  
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federal legislation on the front end,
3
 we might be reassured that the religious 
liberty of Americans is being taken into consideration.
4
 Recent Supreme Court 
decisions in both Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC
5
 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
6
 reflect a judicial consensus 
of the appropriateness and value of religious involvement in public life.
7
 
Yet, within the legal community debates about religion–state interactions 
rarely consider how this relationship functions. Despite increasing interest in 
the role of religious institutions in politics and society more broadly,
8
 there is 




 3 See, e.g., Mihuţ, supra note 1, at 46 (noting how interest groups “have stimulated the representation of 
various categories of people before the government and have facilitated political participation”); see also 
David Yamane & Elizabeth A. Oldmixon, Religion in the Legislative Arena: Affiliation, Salience, Advocacy, 
and Public Policymaking, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 433, 434 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect . . . that a 
religiously informed worldview will act as a filter across policy domains.”).  
 4 See, e.g., Maureen O. Manion, Churches and States: The Politics of Accommodation, 44 J. CHURCH & 
ST. 317, 317–18 (2002); Liliana Mihuţ, Lobbying–A Political Communication Tool for Churches and 
Religious Organizations, J. FOR STUDY RELIGIONS & IDEOLOGIES, Summer 2011, at 64, 74 (detailing the role 
of religious lobbying groups media campaigns and other advocacy tactics in the debate on abortion in Obama’s 
healthcare reform); Monica Youn, Proposition 8 and the Mormon Church: A Case Study in Donor Disclosure, 
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2108, 2112 (2013). On the effect of religion on voting behavior and, consequently, 
legislator action, see James T. Richardson & Sandie Wightman Fox, Religious Affiliation as a Predictor of 
Voting Behavior in Abortion Reform Legislation, 11 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 347 (1972) (finding that 
religious affiliation of state legislators is a stronger indicator of voting behavior on abortion than constituency, 
party, or age). 
 5 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).  
 6 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 7 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: 
Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 114, 118 (2012) (arguing that the decision will leave 
“religion unregulated and out of control”); Marsha B. Freeman, What’s Religion Got to Do with It? Virtually 
Nothing: Hosanna-Tabor and the Unbridled Power of the Ministerial Exemption, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 133, 142 (2013) (arguing that Hosanna-Tabor has given religious organizations protection above and 
beyond that of other employers); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in 
Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405, 429 (2013) (characterizing the decision as creating “a constitutional 
right on steroids”); Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 181 (2014) (calling 
the decision a “jurisprudential earthquake” whose “biggest aftershock has yet to be felt”).  
 8 See, e.g., Ted G. Jelen, Religious Priorities and Attitudes Toward Church and State, 42 REV. 
RELIGIOUS RES. 87, 88 (2000) (attempting to address the question of how religious priorities relate to political 
attitudes); Yamane & Oldmixon, supra note 3, at 434. 
 9 While there is a paucity of references to religious interest groups in the legal literature, there is a 
growing and robust literature studying religious interest groups in political science and sociology. For 
particularly robust discussion, see PAUL A. DJUPE & CHRISTOPHER P. GILBERT, THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF 
CHURCHES (2009); LUKE EUGENE EBERSOLE, CHURCH LOBBYING IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL (1951); ALLEN D. 
HERTZKE, REPRESENTING GOD IN WASHINGTON: THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LOBBIES IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITY (1988); DANIEL J.B. HOFRENNING, IN WASHINGTON BUT NOT OF IT: THE PROPHETIC POLITICS OF 
RELIGIOUS LOBBYISTS 21 (1995); STEVEN M. TIPTON, PUBLIC PULPITS: METHODISTS AND MAINLINE 
CHURCHES IN THE MORAL ARGUMENT OF PUBLIC LIFE (2007); PAUL J. WEBER & W. LANDIS JONES, U.S. 
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Article begins to fill this gap. It outlines how religious involvement in the 
political process has been operationalized through the overlooked institutions 
of “religious interest groups”—associations of either denominational houses of 
worship or collectives of individuals organized to advance a distinct religious 
viewpoint.
10
 This Article then examines the implications of religious interest 
groups for the principal justifications of religious participation in the political 
process: religious liberty and democratic participation.
11
 In undertaking an 
accounting of both benefits and costs of religious involvement in politics via 
religious interest groups, this Article complicates the general support for 
religious participation in the political process. It turns out that advancement of 
the religious voice through religious lobbyists imposes both benefits and costs 
on religious liberty and democracy.
12
 
In advancing this claim, this Article is exploring a subject that is largely 
unrecognized by legal scholars, who have failed to consider the place and role 
of religious interest groups in the legislative process.
13
 This lacuna in the 
literature is surprising given the longstanding and entrenched role of religious 
interest groups in the federal legislative process. Indeed, it is impossible to 
accurately describe the religion–state relationship without an appreciation for 
religious lobbyists. These groups, ranging from well-known church lobbies 
like the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops to less-known coalitions 
and specialist single-issue groups like the Christian Coalition,
14
 are now 
 
RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS: INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES (1994) (providing a comprehensive survey of all 
religious interest groups in the United States); Daniel J.B. Hofrenning, Into the Public Square: Explaining the 
Origins of Religious Interest Groups, 32 SOC. SCI. J. 35 (1995); Paul J. Weber & T.L. Stanley, The Power and 
Performance of Religious Interest Groups, Q. REV., Summer 1984, at 28.  
 10 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 21; see also PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL: RELIGIOUS ADVOCACY GROUPS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 16 (2012), 
available at http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/11/ReligiousAdvocacy_web.pdf [hereinafter LOBBYING FOR 
THE FAITHFUL]; WEBER & JONES, supra note 9, at vii; Weber & Stanley, supra note 9, at 28 (“By religious 
interest groups we mean groups which are active in national politics and which identify themselves as 
religious, have a largely religious membership, and/or are active in areas traditionally considered to be of 
significance to religious groups . . . .”).  
 11 See infra Part II.B (identifying religious liberty and democratic participation as the core justifications 
for religious argument in politics). 
 12 See infra Part III.B–C (outlining how religious interest groups impose costs on religious liberty and 
democratic participation). 
 13 But see Manion, supra note 4 (discussing the politics of religious accommodations); Zoë Robinson, 
Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for Religion, 
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133 (2011) (discussing the political nature of religious accommodations); Youn, 
supra note 4 (alluding to the organized lobbying of the Church of the Latter-Day Saints in opposing 
Proposition 8). 
 14 See LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10; Mihuţ, supra note 4, at 74; Fred Van Geest, 
Christian Denominational and Special Interest Political Action on Public Policy Issues Related to Sexual 
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pivotal players in policy developments and lawmaking.
15
 In highlighting 
religious interest groups’ activities and features, this Article attempts to draw 
religious interest groups out from the shadows of the legislative process and 
reveal that the specialized nature of religious-interest-group lobbying has 
effects on the goals of religious liberty and democracy that merit scholarly 
attention. 
Specifically, this Article claims that the facilitation of religious 
involvement in politics through the medium of religious interest groups 
imposes serious costs on the principal goals of religious participation in the 
political process: religious liberty and democratic participation. It is regularly 
claimed that religious participation in the legislative process is essential to 
achievement of these two goals.
16
 Indeed, a prevailing theme of contemporary 
law and religion scholarship cites the need for protection of religious liberty 
from undue burdens as a key driver for religious voices in politics.
17
 These 
same proponents of religious voice in politics also claim that religious 
involvement in the political process will ensure the broad participation in the 
democratic process, and that participation in the political process will ensure 
that substantive democratic outcomes will reflect inputs of the all members of 
the political community.
18
 Yet, by failing to consider how religious 
participation in the political process is operationalized—through religious 
interest groups—commentators have failed to recognize the tensions among 
these goals.
19
 It turns out that pursuance of religious interests via religious 
 
Orientation, 69 SOC. RELIGION 335 (2008). For a comprehensive database of the active religious interest 
groups in the United States, see Religious Advocacy Sortable Directory, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION & PUB. LIFE 
PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religious-advocacy-directory/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). For historic 
accounts of American religious interest groups, see generally EBERSOLE, supra note 9 (describing religious 
interest groups in America in 1951); WEBER & JONES, supra note 9 (detailing the active religious interest 
groups as of 1991). 
 15 Gregg Ivers, Religious Organizations as Constitutional Litigants, 25 POLITY 243, 244 (1992); see also 
Hofrenning, Public Square, supra note 9, at 35; Mihuţ, supra note 4, at 71; Van Geest, supra note 14, at 336; 
Yamane & Oldmixon, supra note 3, at 434.  
 16 See infra Part II.B (describing the principal goals of religious democratic participation and religious 
liberty). 
 17 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS (2002); Louis 
Fisher, Statutory Exemptions for Religious Freedom, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 291 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, 
Religious Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Reversal of Roles, 2001 BYU L. REV. 611 (2001). 
 18 See, e.g., HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 199–200; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 71; Mihuţ, supra note 1, 
at 46 (claiming that interest groups “have stimulated the representation of various categories of people before 
the government and have facilitated political participation”).  
 19 See, e.g., Mihuţ, supra note 4, at 71 (“[T]he activities developed by churches and religious 
organizations in order to influence public policy are sometimes characterized as a violation of the church – 
state separation . . . .”). 
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interest groups complicates, and ultimately disserves, the goals of religious 
liberty and democratic participation. 
In exploring this complicated question, this Article proceeds in four parts.
20
 
Part I provides a primer on religious interest groups, taking time to describe the 
history of religious interest groups in America. It then identifies the salient 
markers of religious interest groups that define them as unique among interest 
groups—and both uniquely beneficial and uniquely dangerous for religious 
liberty and the democratic process. Ultimately, Part I aims to draw religious 
interest groups out of the shadows of the legislative process and into the public 
forum where the validity of their continued presence in politics can be 
examined. 
Part II examines the benefits said to result from religious interest group 
politicking.
21
 It first sets out the traditional goals stated for justifying the 
continued presence of religion in the legislative process—protection of 
religious liberty and enhancement of democratic participation—before 
considering the unique prowess of religious interest groups in attaining those 
goals. Part III considers the flip side to the benefits posed in Part II and 
articulates the unique and present dangers of religious interest groups in the 
legislative process.
22
 After outlining the traditional concerns for including 
religion in the legislative process, Part III demonstrates how religious interest 
groups amplify and enlarge these traditional concerns. It then describes how 
the success of religious interest groups comes at a cost to both democracy and 
religious liberty, undermining the values enshrined in the First Amendment. 
Part IV concludes by sketching some possible directions for controlling the 
impact of religious interest groups on religious liberty and democracy, while 
recognizing the tradeoffs that will inevitably have to be made.
23
 It considers 
 
 20 The structure and framework for this article is drawn from Miriam Seifter’s excellent article, States as 
Interest Groups in the Legislative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953 (2014). In her article, Professor Seifter 
examines the idea that states act as interest groups in the administrative process, lobbying federal regulatory 
agencies for outcomes that benefit the states. Professor Seifter examines the features of state interest groups, as 
well as the legal framework for state involvement in the administrative process. Professor Seifter posits that 
there are both benefits (protecting state power) and costs (impact on agency decision making, and the 
democratic accountability of agencies) to states lobbying in the administrative process. Professor Seifter’s 
approach is groundbreaking, and I decided to build on her framework and present my study of religious 
interest groups through the same lens. While the structure of the two articles is parallel, this article focuses on 
the discrete issue of lobbying by religious interest groups—not lobbying by the states. 
 21 See infra Part II. 
 22 See infra Part III. 
 23 See infra Part IV. 
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the impact that regulating religious interest groups might have on religious 
speech, as well as religious liberty, and outlines possible reforms that endeavor 
to balance the countervailing interests involved. 
* * * 
Before moving to the substance of this Article, it is necessary to make a 
point about methodology: because this Article begins the project of 
highlighting the presence and role of religious interest groups in the legislative 
process, it does not attempt to sort out how the attributes of religious interests 
groups described in this Article are attributable to interest groups more 
generally, or at the very least to ideological—although secular—interest 
groups specifically (e.g., environmental interest groups). It could be that when 
we compare religious interest groups to secular ideological groups, there is a 
low level of variance in the gains achieved from the lobbying efforts. While 
assessing this empirical question is beyond the scope of this Article, it 
maintains that because of the particular constitutional commitment to religious 
liberty in the First Amendment,
24
 even if there is low—or no—variance 
between the success of secular ideological lobbyists and religious lobbyists, 
any gains made by religious interest groups at the expense of general religious 
liberty, democracy, or both, present specific constitutional concerns that 
commentators must begin to grapple with.
25
 
I. THE RISE AND ROLE OF RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS IN THE FEDERAL 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
This Part presents a descriptive account of religious interest groups in the 
United States, providing the necessary foundation for the subsequent analysis 
of the involvement of religious groups in federal politics in Parts II and III. To 
this end, section A begins the project of defining religious interest groups by 
describing the historic advocacy efforts of those groups traditionally identified 
as religious lobbyists. This sets the scene for section B’s examination of the 
distinctive traits and lobbying practices of religious interest groups. In doing 
so, section B identifies the salient features of religious interest groups that are 
 
 24 The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are contained within the First Amendment, which reads 
in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 25 For an excellent article grappling with the Speech Clause implications of restricting religious speech, 
see Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech Not “Free Speech”?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379 (arguing that 
limits on religious speech are consistent with current Speech Clause doctrine). 
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instrumental to enhancing the values of religious liberty and democracy, yet 
coincide to undermine these goals. 
A. A History of Religious Interest Groups in America 
Religious advocacy has, to some degree, always been part of American 
interest group pluralism. Indeed, at the founding of the Constitution itself, 
many religious groups worked to ensure that a close relationship between 
church and state remained, despite the newly minted First Amendment.
26
 
Religious groups were consistently part of national lobbying campaigns—for 
example, rallying against Sunday mail delivery or Sunday business hours.
27
 
The most prominent early example of religious involvement in issues of 
politics and social policy was the abolition movement. Religious groups 
frequently voiced their opposition to slavery in the public square despite 
government and citizenry rebuke over what was seen as an inappropriate 
attempt by religious groups to influence legislation.
28
 The Quakers were early 
opponents of slavery, with George Keith telling fellow Quakers in 1693 “[n]ot 
to buy any Negroes, unless it were on purpose to set them free.”
29
 
The Quakers were not the only opponents of slavery. The Methodist 
Conference of 1800, for example, directed the “Annual Conference to ‘draw up 
addresses for the gradual emancipation of the slaves, to the legislatures of 
 
 26 There is robust literature on the history of religious lobbyists in the United States. See, e.g., EBERSOLE, 
supra note 9 (examining the activities of church associations in Washington, D.C.); GAINES M. FOSTER, 
MORAL RECONSTRUCTION: CHRISTIAN LOBBYISTS AND THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF MORALITY, 1865–1920 
(2002) (discussing the role of religious groups in the fight against slavery); JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE 
NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2004) (discussing the development of formal religious 
lobby groups in Washington, D.C.); Peter J. Thuesen, The Logic of Mainline Churchliness: Historical 
Background Since the Reformation, in THE QUIET HAND OF GOD: FAITH-BASED ACTIVISM AND THE PUBLIC 
ROLE OF MAINLINE PROTESTANTISM (Robert Wuthnow & John H. Evans eds., 2002); see also LOBBYING FOR 
THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 23–27 (providing a brief overview of the history of religious lobbying in 
America).  
 27 See Marye Lorelle Thomas, Faith-Based Organizations and Legislative Advocacy: A Qualitative 
Inquiry 26–34 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University) (on file with 
the Digital Archive, Virginia Commonwealth University), available at 
https://digarchive.library.vcu.edu/bitstream/handle/10156/1989/thomasml_phd.pdf?sequence=1. Importantly, 
not all religious groups were involved in national politics. Once the First Amendment was ratified, many 
religious groups withdrew from public life completely, believing that the primary role of the church was to 
“encourage faithful relationships between individuals and God” and that the church had no role in politics. See 
HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 35. 
 28 EBERSOLE, supra note 9, at 3–5; Thuesen, supra note 26, at 36. 
 29 EBERSOLE, supra note 9, at 2 (quoting GEORGE KEITH, AN EXHORTATION AND CAUTION TO FRIENDS 
CONCERNING BUYING OR KEEPING OF NEGROES 2 (New York, William Bradford 1693)). 
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those states in which no general laws have been passed for that purpose. . . . 
LET THIS BE CONTINUED FROM YEAR TO YEAR UNTIL THE 
DESIRED END BE ACCOMPLISHED.’”
30
 Driven by their belief that the 
institution of slavery was inherently immoral, as based on their religious faith, 
groups such as the Quakers believed that living a moral life compelled their 
involvement on the national political stage. There was, of course, disagreement 
among religious groups on the issue of slavery, despite the visible and vocal 
presence of the Quakers and other like-minded groups. The impending Civil 
War and the issue of slavery drove many denominational schisms among 
various Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians. Those subgroups within each 
denomination that supported the institution of slavery responded to the 
opponents of slavery with their own interpretations of sacred texts and claims 
as to what morality required with respect to slavery.
31
 
Despite the prominence of religious groups in the national debate over 
slavery, religious lobbying in the United States did not become a permanent 
fixture on the national scene until the late nineteenth century, following the 
post-Civil War expansion of the federal government.
32
 This period represents 
somewhat of a “moral reconstruction” where religious groups organized 
specific subgroups to advocate against the evils of alcohol, Sabbath breaking, 
impurity, and gambling.
33
 Many religious groups made a deliberate choice to 
enter the national political forum and focused their efforts on attempting to 
influence legislation such that it restricted, and therefore controlled, citizens’ 
desire to “sin” and their economic means to do so.
34
 
The most visible example of the lobbying efforts of religious groups in this 
period is the temperance movement.
35
 The temperance movement represented 
 
 30 Id. at 3 (alterations in original) (quoting H. MATTISON, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF 1860, at 29 (New 
York, Mason Bros. 1858)). 
 31 See id. 
 32 See LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 23. 
 33 See FOSTER, supra note 26, at 112; see also MORONE, supra note 26 (discussing the development of 
the religious lobby); Gaines M. Foster, Conservative Social Christianity, the Law, and Personal Morality: 
Wilbur F. Crafts in Washington, 71 CHURCH HIST. 799, 806 (2002) (discussing the religious lobby efforts 
against “the ‘Big Four’ evils, intemperance, impurity, Sabbath breaking, and gambling” (quoting WILBUR F. 
CRAFTS, PATRIOTIC STUDIES OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF MORAL LEGISLATION 62 (1910)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 34 See, e.g., FOSTER, supra note 26, at 112. 
 35 See John L. Merrill, The Bible and the American Temperance Movement: Text, Context, and Pretext, 
81 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 145 (1988); Ian R. Tyrrell, Drink and Temperance in the Antebellum South: An 
Overview and Interpretation, 48 J. S. HIST. 485, 486 (1982); see also Mihuţ, supra note 4, at 72 (“The history 
of religious lobbying started . . . thanks to the activities developed by the Methodist Church to promote ‘the 
cause of temperance’ and to support the Prohibition as a way to combat alcohol-related problems.”). 
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an individual morality issue around which religious leaders and citizens could 
coalesce, prompting the formation of significant religious interest groups, 
separate from (although maintaining significant formal and financial ties with) 
the churches themselves on the national scene.
36
 Many groups, including the 
Anti-Saloon League and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, were 
founded specifically to lobby for a total ban of alcohol in the United States.
37
 
The fulltime officers of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union 
successfully employed legislator knowledge of the large and growing 
grassroots membership in the group as leverage to have their concerns and 
moral reforms brought before Congress and individual legislators.
38
 Other 
examples of the period include lobbying efforts against the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints and the practice of polygamy.
39
 
The religious lobby slowly grew in the early twentieth century, with the 
Christian Science Church and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church being among 
the first religious denominations to establish a permanent advocacy office in 
Washington, D.C. in 1900 and 1901 respectively.
40
 Many of the larger 
denominations followed suit, and by the second decade of the twentieth 
century, religious denominations with advocacy offices in Washington 
included the Methodist Episcopal Church (which became the United Methodist 
Church in 1968), and the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America 
(founded in 1908 and eventually becoming part of the National Council of the 
Churches of Christ in the USA).
41
 In addition to Protestant groups, Catholic 
organizations also set up shop in Washington. Groups such as Catholic 
Charities USA, the National Catholic Educational Association, and various 
 
 36 See EBERSOLE, supra note 9, at 9. 
 37 Id.; see also LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 23. For example, the Charter of the 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union specified as follows: 
That whereas, the object of just government is to conserve the best interests of the governed: and 
whereas the liquor traffic is not only a crime against God, but subversive of every interest of 
society; therefore, in behalf of humanity, we call for such legislation as shall secure this end; and 
while we will continue to employ all moral agencies as indispensable, we hold prohibition to be 
essential to the full triumph of this reform. 
PETER H. ODEGARD, PRESSURE POLITICS: THE STORY OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE 38 (1928); see also 
FOSTER, supra note 26, at 36 (quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION 651 (New York, 
Funk & Wagnalls 1891)). 
 38 See ODEGARD, supra note 37, at 153. 
 39 See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 38–39 (2002). 
 40 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 23. 
 41 Id. at 23–24. 
ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/17/2015 8:41 AM 
1052 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1041 
groups representing America’s Catholic bishops established permanent offices 
in the nation’s capital.
42
 
World War II led to an increase in religious lobbying.
43
 The advent of the 
Selective Service Bill of 1940 brought about activism for conscientious 
objection from churches. For example, members of the pacifist Quaker Church 
formed the Friends Committee on National Legislation in 1943 to advocate for 
the protection of conscientious-objector status.
44
 Around this time, other 
Protestant denominations such as the Baptists, Congregationalists, Lutherans, 
and Presbyterians entered the national lobbying scene.
45
 While growth in the 
religious lobbying market slowed between 1950 and 1970, a number of Jewish 
advocacy groups formed in the wake of the Holocaust and the creation of the 
State of Israel.
46
 The Civil Rights movement of the 1960s also led to a wave of 
religious advocacy groups such as the Progressive National Baptist 
Convention, an African-American Baptist group.
47
 
After 1970, the religious lobby scene in Washington changed markedly.
48
 
Washington experienced a surge in religious groups entering into the overtly 
political lobbying scene. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life notes 
that the number of religious advocacy groups rose at an accelerating pace with 
each successive decade.
49
 The explosion of organizations included a number of 
single-issue advocacy groups (e.g., abortion), as well as more groups 
representing religious schools and colleges, specific denominations, and 
various religious traditions.
50
 The political science literature is replete with 
theories as to why there was such a large explosion of religious interest groups 
entering the lobbying scene in the 1970s. Explanations include a general rise in 
public religious expression,
51
 a trend toward the institutionalism of political 
 
 42 Id. at 25. 
 43 See LEE E. DIRKS, RELIGION IN ACTION: HOW AMERICA’S FAITHS ARE MEETING NEW CHALLENGES 
142–49 (1965); HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 29–32. 
 44 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 25. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See, e.g., id. at 26. 
 47 See, e.g., DIRKS, supra note 43, at 142–49. 
 48 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 32–36; LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26–27; WEBER & 
JONES, supra note 9, at xxvii. 
 49 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26–27. 
 50 Id.; see also DAVID S. GUTTERMAN, PROPHETIC POLITICS: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1–5 (2005); HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 36–37.  
 51 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26; see also HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 32. 
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activism in America more generally,
52
 the continued growth of the federal 
government in everyday life,
53
 as well as the backlash against the Warren 
Court’s expansive interpretation of various individual rights, including a right 
to an abortion,
54
 and the ever increasing restriction of the involvement of 
religion in government institutions, such as schools.
55
 
To quantify the increase in religious interest groups in federal politics, in 
the 1930s there were 10 religious advocacy groups with registered offices in 
Washington.
56
 By 1970 that number increased to 38, and by 2010 there were 
215 registered religious advocacy groups in Washington.
57
 In 2010, these 
groups collectively employed over 1,000 people in the Washington area and 
spent at least $350 million on religious advocacy—with the median annual 
expenditure amounting to almost $1 million.
58
 More than one-third of the 
groups reported annual expenditures of between $1 million and $5 million per 
year, and around one-in-ten groups spent over $5 million per year.
59
 The 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops spent over $26 million in 2009, 
the Family Research Council, a conservative Christian interest group, spent 
over $14 million, and the National Right to Life Committee spent over 
$11 million.
60
 According to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, these 
religious interest groups spend their money on informing constituents, meeting 
with officials, initiating letter or email campaigns, corresponding with 
policymakers, issuing news releases, informing the public, signing coalition 
letters, and writing policy papers.
61
 Religious interest groups, then, are an 
important and entrenched feature of our political system, and it is critical that 
we begin to study and understand their effect on religious liberty and the 
democratic process. 
 
 52 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26; see also RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN 
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990). 
 53 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 26 (noting “the growing reach of the federal 
government in economic, environmental and social policy”).  
 54 See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 243–44 
(2001). 
 55 See, e.g., ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE, AND 
STRATEGIC CHOICES 258–59 (4th ed. 2010). 
 56 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 24. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 13–14, 55. 
 59 Id. at 14. 
 60 Id. at 15; PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., LOBBYING FOR THE 
FAITHFUL: ALL EXPENDITURES DATA 8, 15, 18 (2012), available at http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/11/ 
all-expenditures.pdf. 
 61 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 18. 
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B. The Salient Features of Religious Interest Groups 
This section elucidates four salient features of religious interest groups that 
are critical to the arguments advanced in Parts II and III—that religious interest 
groups thrive as advocates of the values of religious liberty and democracy, yet 
in the end potentially impede both democracy and religious freedom.
62
 The 
four features are as follows: (1) the nature and mission of a religious interest 
group; (2) the unique identity and the variable selection of individual and 
group actors that religious interest groups represent; (3) the distinctive nature 
of the groups’ lobbying; and (4) the relative opacity of religious interest groups 
to both the public generally, and a subset of their members specifically.
63
 
1. Identifying Religious Interest Groups and Their Mission 
First, it is critical to map the contours of what exactly a religious interest 
group looks like, as well as the institutional mission that delineates the 
religious interest group from other religious and religiously based 
organizations. 
Importantly, by “religious interest group,” this Article refers to a 
membership organization that represents some interest that is based on religion 
and attempts to influence politics.
64
 Of course, many religious groups 
participate in politics directly.
65
 However, the group being considered in this 
Article is not itself a church or denominational organization, for example, the 
Catholic Church or the Society of Friends. Instead, a religious interest group is 
a political lobbying group with a formal lobbying presence in Washington, 





 62 This is a point made by Miriam Seifter in the context of states as interest groups. See Seifter, supra 
note 20, at 957 (arguing that it is critical to examine the costs as well as the benefits of states as interest groups 
in the administrative process).  
 63 On similar salient factors that identify states acting as interest groups that are critical to any assessment 
of the normative voracity of states as interest groups, see Seifter, supra note 20. 
 64 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 21; see also WEBER & JONES, supra note 9 (providing a comprehensive 
survey of all religious interest groups in the United States); Weber & Stanley, supra note 9, at 28–29. 
 65 See, e.g., Clark E. Cochrane, Jerry D. Perkins & Murray Clark Havens, Public Policy & the 
Emergence of Religious Politics, 19 POLITY 595 (1987) (examining religious politics in the 1970s and 1980s). 
 66 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 44; LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 16; Robert Zwier, The 
Power and Potential of Religious Interest Groups, 33 J. CHURCH & ST. 271, 271 (1991). Note that some 
groups prefer to use the term “advocacy” rather than “lobbying” largely because the term “religious lobbying” 
might raise the specter of the Internal Revenue Service. On the IRS charitable exemption rules, see Brian 
Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561 (2013) [hereinafter Galle, Charities 
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Religious interest groups present in two forms, with the distinction being 
the principal whose interest the group represents in the political sphere.
67
 In its 
first form, the religious interest group is a representative of a specific religious 
denomination or church.
68
 These groups are interest groups that are 
empowered to represent particular religious traditions, specific congregations, 
or both. Powerful examples of this form of interest group include Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ Office of Public and International Affairs, 
“whose influence and actions are relevant to the mission of The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,”
69
 the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious 
Liberty, which is comprised of “15 national, state and regional Baptist bodies 
in the United States and supported by thousands of churches and individuals 
across the country,”
70
 and the Mennonite Central Committee, established by 
Mennonite denominational bodies to represent their interests in Washington.
71
 
In its second form, the religious interest group does not exist as a 
representative of a church or religious group.
72
 Instead, in this second form, the 
religious interest group represents a collective of individuals whose views are 
expressly derived from—and depend on—a religious perspective. In this form, 
the religious interest group is an intermediary between either an institutional 
religious group and the state, or a collection of individuals whose policy goals 
are based on religious principles. Examples of this form of interest group 
include Catholics Against Capital Punishment, established by American 
Catholics to pursue the abolition of the death penalty in accordance with 
Catholic teachings,
73
 and Concerned Women for America, a group founded by 
Beverly LaHaye to represent the interests of Christian women in the legislative 
 
in Politics]; Brian Galle, The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of Charities, 103 NW. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 370 (2009) [hereinafter Galle, The LDS Church]. 
 67 Interest groups in American politics are often described as political intermediaries between a principal 
(the voters) and the agent (the legislators). See Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through 
Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999). 
 68 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 16. 
 69 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Mission Statement, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION & PUB. LIFE 
PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religious-advocacy/church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints-office-of-
public-and-international-affairs/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 70 About Us, BAPTIST JOINT COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://bjconline.org/mission-history/ 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 71 Quick Facts About MCC U.S., MENNONITE CENT. COMMITTEE, http://mcc.org/press-center/facts (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 72 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 44; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 21–22; LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, 
supra note 10, at 16; Zwier, supra note 66, at 271–72. 
 73 Mission, CATH. MOBILIZING NETWORK, http://catholicsmobilizing.org/mission/ (last visited Mar. 5, 
2015). 
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process.
74
 The definition also includes groups that are organized to influence 
public policy based on an expressly nonreligious perspective.
75
 Critical 
examples of these groups include the American Humanist Association, which 
states that it takes “philosophical issue with beliefs of religious followers,” and 
that they are organized to ensure that a “wall of separation” remains between 
church and state,
76
 as well as the Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, organized to preserve the “constitutional principle of church-state 
separation as the only way to ensure religious freedom for all Americans.”
77
 
In either form, religious interest groups include those groups that do not 
explicitly refer to themselves as “religious,” instead calling their advocacy 
agenda “faith based.” The term “faith based” evolved as a consequence of the 
uneasiness over the presence of explicitly identified religious groups in 
politics.
78
 The shift from “religious” to “faith based” substituted a term that 
described an organized set of beliefs (religion) to a term that connoted reliance 
on “trust in truth,” thereby getting around the traditional objection of any overt 
relationship between religion and the state.
79
 The shift by some groups from 
identifying as religious interest groups to faith-based groups represents both a 
discomfort with the idea of overt lobbying as a principled issue, as well as the 
practical concern of church groups to remain in compliance with IRS rules 




 74 Our History, CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AM., http://www.cwfa.org/about/our-history/ (last visited Mar. 
5, 2015). 
 75 This is the approach of leading political scientists studying religious interest groups. See, e.g., 
HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 22; Robert Zwier, The World and Worldview of Religious Lobbyists (Apr. 4–6, 
1988) (unpublished manuscript presented at the meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago) (on file with the Emory Law Journal). 
 76 Frequently Asked Questions, AM. HUMANIST ASS’N, http://americanhumanist.org/AHA/Frequently_ 
Asked_Questions (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 77 Our Mission, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION CHURCH & ST., https://www.au.org/about/our-mission 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 78 See sources cited supra note 66 (noting that religious lobbying is considered by some to be suspect, 
and some groups prefer the nomenclature “faith based advocates”); see also William Safire, The Way We Live 
Now—6-27-99: On Language; Faith-Based, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 16 (speculating on 
the nomenclature evolution from the use of “religious” to “faith-based”); Steven Rathgeb Smith & Michael R. 
Sosin, The Varieties of Faith-Related Agencies, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 651 (2001) (discussing faith-based 
groups). 
 79 Safire, supra note 78, at 16; Thomas, supra note 27, at 4–7. 
 80 Churches and the like are typically registered as tax–exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue 
Service Code and are thus limited in the amount of lobbying activity that they can undertake. 
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also infra notes 296–305 and accompanying text (discussing the limits 
imposed by the Internal Revenue Service on the lobbying activities of exempt groups). In addition, there are 
potential Establishment Clause issues raised by direct religious group engagement with the state in the manner 
ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/17/2015 8:41 AM 
2015] LOBBYING IN THE SHADOWS 1057 
Collectively, what religious interest groups share is a common institutional 
mission. Religious interest groups’ advocacy efforts were initiated to create a 
mechanism for religious groups and individuals to express their religiously 
based views on public policy—a voice for religion qua religion.
81
 Today, 
religious interest groups continue their focus on facilitating the dissemination 
of a religious perspective in the legislative process. According to the Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life, to be classified as a national religious 
interest group, a group would need to either advocate on behalf of a particular 
denomination or tradition, advocate on behalf of a constituency defined in 
religious terms, advocate on behalf of a religious institution or group of 
institutions, promote religious values in public policy, promote an expressly 
secular or nonreligious perspective on public policy, or encourage 
policymakers to integrate faith into their work.
82
 
For religious interest groups, advocating for public policy from a religious 
perspective encompasses many activities. Many of the advocacy efforts 
include lobbying attempts to influence legislators or the public,
83
 but it can also 
include broader activities aimed at Congress and the Executive branch and its 
related administrative agencies. For example, in 2008, the Family Research 
Council spent over $14 million on advocacy efforts,
84
 including “mobilizing 
the grassroots,” “fighting for family tax relief” in Congress, and “combating 
judicial activism that leads to court rulings that hurt families.”
85
 Another 
example is the American Jewish Committee, which spent over $13 million on 
advocacy efforts,
86
 including “lobby days, private meetings with members of 
congress, community mobilization on issues of concern, and meeting with 
 
described in this Article. On this point, see infra Part IV.B (outlining the relevant Establishment Clause 
doctrine).  
 81 See LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 16. 
 82 See id. at 63; see also HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 22; WEBER & JONES, supra note 9, at 8–12 
(including groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Ethical Union, which are 
nominally non-religious but advocate on issues that are of concern to religion).  
 83 See Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Lobbying Issues, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 1997, at 261 (1996), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicp97.pdf; see also Galle, Charities in Politics, supra note 
66. 
 84 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 15. 
 85 FAQs, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/faqs (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (follow hyperlink 
associated with the question “What is FRC Action?”). 
 86 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 15. 
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high-ranking officials of local governments.”
87
 Combined, religious interest 
groups spent in excess of $350 million on similar advocacy efforts in 2008.
88
 
Many religious interest groups publicize mission statements, official 
positions, or long-standing conventions that explicitly specify the groups’ goal 
of advancing the needs and concerns of particular denominations and 
individuals, based on the religious principles of the group, groups, or 
individuals that the interest group represents. The Family Research Council, 
for example, “champions marriage and the family as the foundation of 
civilization, the seedbed of virtue,” and aims to “shape public debate” where 
“God is the author of life, liberty, and the family.”
89
 CitizenLink “inspires men 
and women to live out biblical citizenship that transforms culture,” focusing on 
“issues involving the sanctity of human life, the preservation of religious 
liberties and the well-being of the family as the building block of society,” 
“from a foundation firmly established in a biblical worldview.”
90
 Concerned 
Women for America strives to “protect and promote Biblical values among all 
citizens . . . thereby reversing the decline in moral values in our nation,” where 
“women and like-minded men, from all walks of life, [can] come together and 
restore the family to its traditional purpose.”
91
 The mission statement of the 
National Organization for Marriage specifies that the group is organized “to 
defend marriage and the faith communities that sustain it.”
92
 The Traditional 
Values Coalition states that its role is to press for legislative change based on 
“Bible-based traditional values,” including “[p]rotecting traditional marriage 
and family as the cornerstone of society” and “[s]ecuring the Constitution 
against the growing threat of Islam and Shariah law” on behalf of “like-minded 
 
 87 Public Policy and Advocacy, AM. JEWISH COMMITTEE, http://www.ajcwashington.org/site/ 
c.gpLLJOOtHmE/b.877021/k.5C34/Public_Policy__Advocacy.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 88 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 14. 
 89 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Family Research Council in Support of Petitioners Addressing the Merits 
and Supporting Reversal at 1, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 314462; 
Marriage and Family, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/Marriage-and-Family (last visited Mar. 5, 
2015); State Family Policy Councils, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/state-policy-organizations (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2015) (“Family Policy Councils (FPCs) accomplish at the state level what Family Research 
Council does at the national level—shape public debate and formulate public policy.”). 
 90 About Us, CITIZENLINK, http://www.citizenlink.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 91 Our Mission, CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AM., http://www.cwfa.org/about/vision-mission/ (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2015). 
 92 Our Work, NAT’L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE, https://nationformarriage.org/main/ourwork (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2015). 
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patriots.”
93
 These mission statements also highlight the next feature of 
religious interest groups, unclear identity and representation. 
2. Religious Interest Group Identity and Representation 
The second salient feature of religious interest groups that requires some 
discussion is that although religious interest groups describe themselves as 
advancing a specific religious view, that claim obscures difficult questions of 
what precisely the “religious interest” comprises, as well as whom the group 
represents.
94
 These complicated, yet interrelated, questions about religious 
identity and representation lead to doubts about the plausibility of a religious 
view. 
These difficulties are not present, or at least less prevalent, in the context of 
mainstream secular lobby groups.
95
 In the context of secular lobby groups, it is 
relatively straightforward to identify the interests that secular lobby groups 
represent—the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable for 
example represent specified businesses in the political sphere.
96
 These groups 
have clearly stated interests and goals, directed by people who agree on the 
political agenda and whose success is measured by the nature of the benefits 
accruing to the member organizations.
97
 
Identifying both the religious interest and the constituency whom the 
religious interest group represents is far more challenging because the religious 
interest group can potentially represent up to three different principals at once, 
each with variable ideas about the nature of the religious interest that should be 
advocated for in the political sphere.
98
 First, religious interest groups represent 
 
 93 About TVC, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION, http://www.traditionalvalues.org/content/about (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 94 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 94–116; KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 26 (2d ed. 1992).  
 95 It is, of course, possible to identify various interest groups representing a social issue, for example the 
environment, where the lobbyist also represents multiple principals. However, this Article maintains that as a 
general matter, this multiple principal issue is of particular significance for religious interest groups given the 
inevitable recourse to both a higher power, the hierarchical institutional power responsible for disseminating 
the religious message, and the membership body of religious adherents.  
 96 See About, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, http://businessroundtable.org/about (last visited Mar. 5, 2015); About 
the U.S. Chamber, U.S. CHAMBER COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/about-us/about-us-chamber (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 97 See Issacaroff & Ortiz, supra note 67. 
 98 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 95; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 17; see also HANNA FENICHEL 
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); REPRESENTATION: ELECTIONS AND BEYOND (Jack H. 
Nagel & Rogers M. Smith eds., 2013). 
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a sociocultural group—the individuals who profess belief in the tradition on 
which the religious interest group relies for its existence and continued 
relevance.
99
 Second, at least in one of their manifestations, religious interest 
groups potentially represent a specific religious institution or set of 
institutions.
100
 Finally, religious interest groups represent and depend on a 




Religious interest groups vary in how they characterize which actors the 
group represents. While the groups almost universally emphasize their ability 
to speak to “the religious view,” the groups vary as to how they regard whom 
they represent. For example, the formal religious interest group for the 
Episcopal Church, the Office of Government Relations, states that they 
represent the voice of all Episcopalians.
102
 Conversely, the American Baptist 
National Ministries’ Office of Governmental Relations specifies that they 
represent American Baptist Churches USA in the United States.
103
 
The most complicating dimension of the representational claims is arguably 
the final dimension: that religious lobbyists not only represent the individuals 
and institutions that tasked them with a public policy agenda, but they are also 
called to represent and remain faithful to a theological tradition.
104
 This is an 
additional burden over and above being responsive to member individuals or 
institutions, and there is an expectation that at all times the religious interest 
groups will be responsive and faithful to the demands of a religious faith. The 
problem is, of course, that any understanding of a particular faith-based 
perspective necessarily differs member to member, and institution to 
institution. 
 
 99 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 95; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 17. 
 100 See, e.g., Rachel Kraus, Laity, Institution, Theology, or Politics? Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish 
Washington Offices’ Agenda Setting, 68 SOC. RELIGION 67 (2007); see also supra notes 67–80 and 
accompanying text (describing the different forms of religious interest groups). 
 101 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 17. 
 102 Episcopal Church, Office of Government Relations Mission Statement, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION & 
PUB. LIFE PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religious-advocacy/episcopal-church-office-of-government-
relations/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 103 American Baptist Churches USA, National Ministries’ Office of Governmental Relations Mission 
Statement, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION & PUB. LIFE PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religious-
advocacy/american-baptist-churches-usa-national-ministries-office-of-governmental-relations/ (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2015). 
 104 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 104–111; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 17. See generally ALLEN D. 
HERTZKE, ECHOES OF DISCONTENT: JESSE JACKSON, PAT ROBERTSON, AND THE RESURGENCE OF POPULISM 
(1993) (analyzing Jackson’s and Robertson’s presidential campaigns, which emphasized a need to address 
national moral and economic crises, and how their parties responded to these campaigns). 
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3. Opaque Membership and Operations 
Related to the unclear identity and representation of religious interest 
groups, religious interest groups are often opaque in both their operations and 
their membership.
105
 Although an entrenched part of the political process, by 
and large religious interest groups are private entities and therefore not subject 
to the standard mechanisms of making government open to the public. While 
religious interest groups are directly analogous to formal lobbying groups, 
possessing the same indicia in terms of formation, interest-based agenda, and 
action, religious interest groups are generally not subject to the formal 
disclosure requirements of lobbying groups. 
Pursuant to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995
106
 (LDA), lobbyists are 
required to formally register as lobbyists and report communications with the 
political branches of government, as well as monies spent and received in 
attempts to influence government behavior.
107
 The LDA, however, provides 
for a number of limited exceptions, including lobbying communications made 
by “a church, its integrated auxiliary, or a convention or association of 
churches that is exempt from filing a Federal income tax return,” as well as “a 
religious order.”
108
 Pursuant to these exceptions, the only instance where a 
religious interest group that falls within this definition must disclose their 
lobbying is if it spends a “substantial” amount of money on lobbying, if more 
than twenty percent of its lobbyists income is from direct lobbying, or if it 
hires an outside lobbying firm.
109
 Because churches and their directly related 
religious interest groups are tax-exempt, they largely avoid the attention of the 
 
 105 See LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 53, 55. 
 106 Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614 (2012)). 
 107 Id. Other significant federal lobbying laws include the Byrd Amendment. See 31 U.S.C. § 1352 (2012) 
(prohibiting the use of funds appropriated by Congress to lobby for any type of a federal award); see also 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL 5 
(William V. Luneburg et. al. eds., 4th ed. 2009) (describing the history for federal lobbying regulation); 
Thomas M. Susman & William V. Luneberg, History of Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals Since 1955, in 
THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra, at 23 (describing the history for federal lobbying regulation); Richard L. 
Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012) (analyzing the 
constitutionality of lobbying reform). 
 108 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(B)(xviii)(I)–(II); see also Zachary Newkirk, God’s Lobbyists: The Hidden Realm 
of Religious Influence, OPENSECRETS BLOG (July 13, 2011), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/07/gods-
lobbyists.html. 
 109 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); SENATE OFFICE OF PUB. RECORDS & HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RES. CTR., 
LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT GUIDANCE (2014), available at http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/ 
ldaguidance.pdf; David C. Vladeck, Special Considerations for Lobbying by Nonprofit Corporations, in THE 
LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 107, at 401; see also infra Part IV.C (describing the possibilities for reforming 
these restrictions). 
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Internal Revenue Service, and it is extremely rare for the IRS to examine 
whether the church has spent a “substantial” amount of money on lobbying.
110
 
Those religious interest groups that are exempt from the lobbying 
disclosure requirements are generally not voluntarily forthcoming. Most 
groups do not publicize a list of members, nor do they disclose the 
involvement or participation in interest group activities of their members.
111
 
There are exceptions. For example, the Friends Committee on National 
Legislation, a nonprofit founded by members of the Society of Friends (i.e., the 
Quaker church), voluntarily discloses its lobbying expenditures annually. In an 
email to the website OpenSecrets Blog, a representative of the interest group 
stated that “Quakers value integrity and truth-telling highly, so we willingly 
disclose our lobbying activities.”
112
 Apart from these exceptional groups, most 
information about the internal operations of religious interest groups, as well as 
their membership, is garnered from surveys and inside information.
113
 
4. Distinctive Nature of Lobbying 
The fourth important feature of religious interest groups is that they engage 
in a form of lobbying that is largely distinct from the lobbying of standard 
interest groups. Standard lobby groups typically advocate for the governmental 
enactment of either regulation to curb behaviors affecting their members (e.g., 
unfair competition policy or prohibition of fraudulent advertising), distributive 
policies to ensure members receive some tangible government aid (e.g., tariffs 
 
 110 See supra notes 107–09 (discussing the Lobbying Disclosure Act); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing 
the interaction between tax exemptions for churches pursuant to the Internal Revenue Service Code and the 
exemptions under the Lobbying Disclosure Act). The National Association of Evangelicals has implicitly 
spoken to the exemption for these organizational forms from lobbying requirements. In its publication “For the 
Health of the Nation,” the group stated in its preamble that: 
Evangelical Christians in America face a historic opportunity. We make up fully one quarter of 
all voters in the most powerful nation in history. Never before has God given American 
evangelicals such an awesome opportunity to shape public policy . . . . The First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause is directed only at government and restrains its power. Thus, for example, 
the clause was never intended to shield individuals from exposure to the religious views of 
nongovernmental speakers. Exemptions from regulations or tax burdens do not violate the 
Establishment Clause, for government does not establish religion by leaving it alone. 
NAT’L ASS’N OF EVANGELICALS, FOR THE HEALTH OF THE NATION: AN EVANGELICAL CALL TO CIVIC 
RESPONSIBILITY (2004), http://www.nae.net/images/content/For_The_Health_Of_The_Nation.pdf. 
 111 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 149–52. 
 112 Newkirk, supra note 108. 
 113 See, e.g., LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 53 (detailing how statistics on religious 
interest groups are not consistently reported, therefore information was obtained from “websites, 
questionnaires and interviews”). 
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and subsidies), redistributive policies (e.g., social security), or constituent 
policy to control power within the government (e.g., apportionment).
114
 The 
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) is a prominent example 
of a lobby group that pursues at least one of these types of typical policies. For 
example, the NFIB is well known for its attempts to force regulatory policy in 
the interests of its members—small businesses. The NFIB has been actively 
pressuring the federal government to repeal the employer mandate provision in 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in order to protect its members 
from potentially crippling financial obligations.
115
 Another example is the 
environmental group, National Wildlife Federation, which advocates for 
regulatory change to the end of conservation goals, as well as redistributive 
policies to fund conservation projects.
116
 
By and large, religious interest groups are distinguishable from standard 
lobbying groups.
117
 Political scientists have aptly named religious interest 
groups “radicalized” lobbyists, a descriptor that captures both the nature of the 
outcomes sought, as well as the manner in which these outcomes are 
pursued.
118
 The suggestion that religious interest groups are distinct, both in 
outcomes sought and behavior engaged in to achieve those outcomes, is 
striking and warrants some unpacking. 
As a general matter, religious interest groups seek policy that is based on, 
and driven by, a particular religious perspective; that is, directly derived from 
fundamental faith-based values. The radical lobbyist is motivated by a vision 
 
 114 Theodore J. Lowi, Foreword: New Dimensions in Policy and Politics, in SOCIAL REGULATORY 
POLICY: MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS, at x, x–xi (Raymond Tatalovich & Byron W. Daynes 
eds., 1988). For an excellent overview of the mechanics of lobbying, see Richard L. Hall & Richard Anderson, 
Issue Advertising and Legislative Advocacy in Health Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 221 (Allan J. 
Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 8th ed. 2012); Burdett A. Loomis, Learning to Lobby: Groups, Venues, and 
Information in Eighteenth-Century America, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra, at 37; ANTHONY J. NOWNES, 
TOTAL LOBBYING: WHAT LOBBYISTS WANT (AND HOW THEY TRY TO GET IT) (2006). 
 115 Healthcare Legislative Activity: The Next Steps for Reform, NFIB (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://www.nfib.com/article/healthcare-legislative-activity-the-next-steps-for-reform-1363/. 
 116 Advocating for Conservation Policy, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, http://www.nwf.org/What-We-
Do/Conservation-Policy.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 117 Of course, religious interest groups can, and do, lobby for the typical policies outlined in this section, 
for example tax breaks. However, religious interest groups also lobby for fundamental change to generally 
applicable laws, driven by a religious viewpoint. It is this aspect of religious lobbying that is the core focus of 
this Article. 
 118 See, e.g., HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55–57; Lowi, supra note 114, at xii–xiv. 
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of the state that is based on a particular version of a religious tradition.
119
 
Initially, this may not seem concerning. There seems nothing uniquely 
troubling about advocating for policies directed by a particular faith-based 
vision of how the law should work. Superficially, this seems to be the epitome 
of pluralism in politics, where citizens and their advocates have the 
opportunity—and indeed, the right—to present their views from whatever 
perspective motivates them. However, once we dig a little deeper, it is possible 
to see that the image of citizens presenting their religious viewpoint to the 
collective for consideration is based on idealized assumptions about religion 
and a thin understanding of religious interest groups as facilitators of religious 
participation in the political process. 
Interest groups are formed to seek outcomes reflective of their members’ 
interests, not to ensure a participatory voice in the political process. Religious 
interest groups are no different in this regard, and religious interest groups are 
formed to lobby for the best outcomes for the religious group.
120
 While there 
are many reasons why religious groups are politically active, the core reason is 
that many churches feel that it is their responsibility to influence politics with 
their morals and values.
121
 For example, the former head of the religious 
interest group Bread for the World stated that “the Christian faith and moral 
teaching have implications for politics. Churches should be active in bringing 
those values to bear in political life.”
122
 For many religious institutions and 
religious individuals, tasking religious interest groups with bringing religious 
values to the political forum is a way of ensuring that society is just, and that 
members of society are guided “in distinguishing right from wrong, whether 
practical in, or out of government.”
123
 
This is not a participatory goal. Instead, just as standard interest groups are 
driven by results in terms of outcomes reflective of the perspectives of their 
members, so too are religious groups driven by forcing outcomes reflective of 
 
 119 See W. PHILLIPS SHIVELY, POWER AND CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 97–98 (3d 
ed. 1993) (discussing the distinction between mainstream incremental lobbying and radical politics); 
HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55. 
 120 See, e.g., EBERSOLE, supra note 9; HERTZKE, supra note 9; HOFRENNING, supra note 9.  
 121 See Dean M. Kelley, The Rationale for the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic, in THE ROLE 
OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 159 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1991); Erik J. 
Ablin, Student Article, The Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on Church Participation in 
Political Campaigns, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 573 (1999).  
 122 Ablin, supra note 121, at 573 (quoting Julia McCord, Election Guide Suit Sparks Debate About 
Election Guidelines, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 24, 1996, at 63SF) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123 Id. at 574 (quoting Tony Maggio, Editorial, Churches Help Distinguish Right, Wrong, DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, July 26, 1997, at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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their members’ religious perspective. For example, the Association of Jesuit 
Colleges and Universities states that it represents the interests of American’s 
twenty-eight Jesuit colleges and universities and that those interests include 
congressional appropriations, budget, higher education authorization issues, 
and taxes.
124
 Similarly, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB) Office of Governmental Relations (OGR) specifies that it represents 
the hierarchy of Catholic bishops within the United States and U.S. Virgin 
Islands. The interests of the USCCB advocated for by the OGR include 
prohibition of same-sex marriage, prohibition of abortion, Catholic education, 
and international justice and peace.
125
 Once we start to view religious interest 
groups as driven to an end, rather than being satisfied with participating in the 
political milieu, the particular concern about religious interest groups 
specifically—and the reason why political scientists refer to them as “radical” 
lobbyists—becomes more apparent. 
It is precisely because of the moral outcomes that religious interest groups 
seek that religious interest groups are “radical.” The self-interest that drives 
religious interest groups is based on a particular vision of the world and the 
law that is based in religion. Religion, by definition, is an issue of faith.
126
 
There are a multitude of religious traditions and practices throughout the 
United States. Indeed, the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses were enacted 
to protect the rights of Americans to freely believe and practice in whatever 
faith tradition moves them. Ultimately, religious interest groups advocate to 
entrench one specific religious perspective into law; they are motivated by a 
vision in which their specific religious values dominate the state.
127
 Thus, 
while religious interest groups look like standard interest groups, working to 
exert pressure in the classic sense, religious interest groups seek outcomes that 
are entirely different from classic interest groups. Religious interest groups are 
not concerned with material spoils (i.e., classic economic rents), but instead 
religious interest groups seek change in the law based on their own religious 
understanding.
128
 The USCCB is an illuminating example of this. One of the 
 
 124 Federal Relations, ASS’N JESUIT COLLEGES & U., http://www.ajcunet.edu/federal (last visited Mar. 5, 
2015). 
 125 Government Relations, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/about/government-relations/ 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 126 See Gey, supra note 25, at 451. See generally Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering 
the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 
(1990) (arguing that religious expression should only be protected to the same extent as all other forms of 
expression). 
 127 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 107. 
 128 Id.; see also Lowi, supra note 114, at x–xii.  
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USCCB’s interests is resisting legislative change that would permit same-sex 
marriage. The USCCB states, 
We oppose efforts to make any other personal relationship the 
equivalent of marriage in law, regulation, or any other public policy. 
We will oppose measures that seek to redefine or erode the meaning 
of marriage. The family—based on marriage between a man and a 
woman—is the first and fundamental unit of society and is a 




These religiously based and religiously driven outcomes sought by 
religious interest groups drive their behavior in the legislative process.
130
 
Social scientists have shown that the ideological intensity of religious interest 
groups is markedly higher than the intensity demonstrated by standard interest 
groups, including ideologically driven interest groups.
131
 The degree of 
ideological intensity matters because it is determinative in what constitutes an 
acceptable policy outcome. For standard lobbyists, whose ideological intensity 
is typically lower than the religious lobbyist, acceptable policy outcomes 
include policies that do not directly reflect their ideal policy outcome.
132
 
Instead, standard interest groups recognize that in order to get as close as 
possible to their ideal point, coalition with other interest groups and 
government officials, and consequently compromise on their ideal point, is 
essential to achieve any result.
133
 This means that consensus is possible, and 
legislators can work with a number of different interest groups on the same 
policy in an attempt to reduce differences to a point where all interested parties 
can be satisfied with the outcome. In other words, these standard interest 
groups are willing to accept smaller, more incremental change to the policy 




Unlike standard lobby groups, for the religious interest group an acceptable 
policy outcome is one that mirrors their ideal policy outcome. As discussed 
above, the ideal policy outcome for religious interest groups is the 
entrenchment of their religious perspective on the policy at issue. For religious 
 
 129 Government Relations, supra note 125. 
 130 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 106–08. 
 131 See Lowi, supra note 114, at xi; see also HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55–57. 
 132 See SHIVELY, supra note 119, at 97–98 (discussing the distinction between mainstream incremental 
lobbying and radical lobbying). 
 133 See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 114; NOWNES, supra note 114. 
 134 See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 114; NOWNES, supra note 114. 
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lobbyists, consensus and compromise on the ultimate outcome is akin to 
trivialization of the religious perspective that drives their advocacy efforts.
135
 
In other words, because religious lobbyists tend to be animated by the view 
that the policy that they are advocating for is fundamentally correct in their 
religious worldview, any differences with external parties are irreducible. For 
the religious lobbyist, the only acceptable outcome is a policy that reflects the 
religiously driven policy being presented.
136
 Unlike standard interest groups, 
then, compromise is impossible—the acceptable outcome is one that reflects 
the ideal outcome.
137
 The Presbyterian Office of Public Witness (representing 
the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) in Washington), for example, states clearly 
that “[i]ts task is to advocate, and help the church to advocate, the social 
witness perspectives and policies of the Presbyterian General Assembly.”
138
 It 
further specifies that in order to “remain true to its biblical roots, theological 
heritage, and contemporary practice,” it “must not fall silent” and instead 
“must speak faithfully, truthfully, persuasively, humbly, boldly and 
urgently.”
139
 The implication is clear—nothing short of the religious viewpoint 
proposed by this religious interest group will be acceptable. 
Ultimately, then, religious interest groups have different expectations of the 
legislative process than standard interest groups. What this refusal to accept 
compromise-based change means is that any legislative success of the religious 
interest group does not reflect a balance of the views of the represented groups. 
Instead, when religious interest groups successfully agitate for a particular 
policy outcome, the process becomes winner takes all.
140
 As leading political 
scientist Daniel Hofrenning notes, “Religious lobbyists seek to fundamentally 
transform the political and social reality of America. These sweeping goals are 




* * * 
As Parts II and III argue, each of these four features of religious interest 
group participation in the political process contributes to the mixed results for 
 
 135 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55; see also Lowi, supra note 114, at x–xii. 
 136 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 52–53. 
 137 Id. 
 138 About Us, PRESBYTERIAN MISSION AGENCY, http://www.presbyterianmission.org/ministries/ 
washington/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 139 Id. 
 140 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 55. 
 141 Id. at 107. 
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the values of religious liberty and democracy. As Part II notes, the groups’ 
commitment to promoting religious goals makes religious interest groups a 
strong voice for religious liberty and ensures inclusive participation in the 
democratic process. However, as Part III outlines, these features of religious 
interest groups ironically obstruct and undermine the goals of religious liberty 
and democracy. 
II. THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS IN PROMOTING RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY 
Part I provided the necessary foundational information on the practices and 
features of religious interest groups. The analysis in Parts II and III will draw 
on these features of religious interest groups and attempt to demonstrate the 
implications and effects of religious interest group involvement in the 
legislative process on the goals of enhancing religious liberty and equal 
democratic participation and consideration. 
Specifically, Part II argues that religious interest groups are generally 
reliable advocates for the values of religious liberty and democracy. However, 
in Part III I will outline that despite this consistent advocacy, religious interest 
groups actually fail to facilitate, and sometimes repress, democratic ideals as 
well as compromise the religious liberty of both the religious viewpoints that 
they purport to represent and the polity as a whole by effectively capturing 
political outcomes. 
These diverse—and indeed, contradictory—results reflect deep, latent 
tensions in the drive for religious liberty in the American polity between the 
various religious interest groups’ goals of protecting their own religious 
liberty, seeking a diverse and active religious pluralism as a whole, and being 
active participants in the democratic process. The practice of a religious 
interest group in advancing the single religious view of the principal it 
represents—and their lack of accountability and transparency—facilitates 
representation of a religious viewpoint in the political process. But at the same 
time, that practice of presenting a single religious position obscures the 
diversity of religious views, both within a particular faith tradition and between 
religions generally, undermining a broader religious pluralism, and variously 
masking internal dissent, policy drift, capture, and disengagement. 
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A. Identifying Benefits: Protecting Religious Freedom and Democracy 
Religious interest groups are beneficial for religious individuals and 
religious institutions because, like interest groups more generally, they 
overcome the core problem facing proponents of robust religious participation 
in the legislative process: that religious individuals and religious institutions 
are not necessarily consistent advocates of either or both their own religious 
liberty or participatory rights in the legislative process. Before explaining how 
religious interest groups have largely overcome this problem, some elucidation 
of the goals of religious participation in the legislative process is required. 
Religious participation in the legislative process—and indeed in politics 
more generally—is generally justified on one of two grounds: first, that 
religious participation advances religious liberty, and second, that religious 
participation serves democratic values.
142
 Each of these justifications requires 
some unpacking. 
A core contemporary justification for active religious participation in the 
legislative process is to advance the value of religious liberty.
143
 To serve the 
value of religious liberty, including the ability of religious citizens to fully 
practice their religious faith, it is argued that religious participation in the 
legislative process is essential.
144
 The claim is that exclusion of religious 
citizens from the legislative process would violate First Amendment values of 
religious freedom.
145
 Specifically, the claim is that restricting religion and 
religious values from political debate violates the right of religious citizens to 
freely exercise their religion in America, and is tantamount to establishing 
secularism, in contravention of the Establishment Clause.
146
 In this context, 
 
 142 See ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF 
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE 77 (1997); STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN: THE 
WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS (2000); NEUHAUS, supra note 2; McConnell, supra note 2. 
 143 See, e.g., AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 142, at 105 (stating that for many religious believers it is 
not “for them, about something other than their social and political existence; it is also about their social and 
political existence”); CARTER, supra note 142, at 25–26 (focusing on the salience of religious argument to 
believers); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on 
Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1599 (1987) (“When religious morality is 
excluded from politics, the religious individual is alienated from public life.”). 
 144 See, e.g., Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 143, at 1599. 
 145 See, e.g., id.; McConnell, supra note 2. 
 146 CARTER, supra note 142, at 3 (“[I]f we build too high the walls that are intended to keep religion out of 
politics, we will face religious people who will storm the barricades and declare the government no longer 
legitimate . . . .”); Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 143, at 1600 (“If the religious people who constitute the 
majority of Americans come to believe, as many already do, that the law making process does not respect their 
religious beliefs . . . then they themselves will respect neither the process nor the laws that it generates.”); 
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protecting religious liberty means ensuring the right of religious adherents to 
participate in the political process. Some additional notes will help to fill out 
this idea. 
For most proponents of a politically active religious life, the idea that they 
cannot participate in the legislative process publically devalues their faith.
147
 
Government inevitably makes decisions on moral issues that are salient for 
many believers, for example abortion, same-sex marriage, wealth 
redistribution, and the death penalty. At some point, the people will be asked to 
use their moral judgments to determine their own responses as well as direct 
the governmental response. Religion frequently plays a role in determining 
these responses.
148
 Some commentators claim that as people debate and engage 
in difficult moral questions, restricting religious participation is necessarily a 
restriction on that person’s religious liberty to freely act on her religious 
beliefs.
149
 For these commentators, restricting religion in this way unfairly 
singles out religion for discriminatory treatment. In doing so, the liberty of 
religious citizens is affected in a way that the liberty of nonreligious citizens is 
not.
150
 While there have been some concerns voiced that religious participation 
in politics will impose on the liberty of non-adherents, the response is simply 
that inclusion in political debate is necessary for the liberty of religious 
adherents, and the liberty of non-adherents is unaffected because mere 
participation does not dictate policy outcomes.
151
 That is, religious arguments 
 
McConnell, supra note 2, at 650 (positing that restrictions on religious political argument “will deepen the 
anger and hostility that [religious] citizens feel toward the hegemonic and exclusionary practices of the secular 
power structure”). 
 147 See, e.g., Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 143, at 1600 (“If the religious people who constitute the 
majority of Americans come to believe, as many already do, that the law making process does not respect their 
religious beliefs . . . then they themselves will respect neither the process nor the laws that it generates.”). 
 148 See, e.g., Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 677 (1993) (discussing the exclusion of religion from public debate). 
 149 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 142, at 25–26 (focusing on the salience of religious argument to 
believers). 
 150 See, e.g., AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 142, at 72–76 (arguing that liberal calls to exclude 
religious argument from public political debate violate the fundamental liberal commitment to equal freedom); 
Jason Carter, Toward a Genuine Debate About Morals, Religion, Politics, and Law: Why America Needs a 
Christian Response to the “Christian” Right, 41 GA. L. REV. 69, 82 (2006) (rejecting as unfair to religious 
believers the idea of excluding religious arguments because they might alienate nonbelievers); Hollenbach, 
supra note 2, at 897 (“Persons or groups should not face political disability or disenfranchisement simply 
because their political views are rooted in religious traditions and beliefs.”); Gregory P. Magarian, Religious 
Argument, Free Speech Theory, and Democratic Dynamism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119, 133–34 (2011); 
Michael J. Perry, Liberal Democracy and Religious Morality, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 18 (1998) (arguing that 
the morality and ethics of liberal democracy do not require religious believers to forego reliance on religious 
arguments in making political decisions).  
 151 Magarian, supra note 150, at 133–34. 
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simply make “one contribution among others in a debate on how political 
power is to be used.”
152
 
In addition to the protection of religious liberty, most defenses of the right 
of religious citizens to engage in the political process claim that the democratic 
process is undermined by the exclusion of religious viewpoints.
153
 That is, to 
safeguard the democratic structures and to ensure politics is appropriately 
representative, the claim is that religious citizens must retain the ability to 
engage in the political process.
154
 Removing religion from politics actively 
threatens American democracy. Richard Neuhaus, for example, claims that 
removing religion from the public domain would result in secularism—a 
“naked public square” that is far more dangerous to democracy than 
religion.
155
 For Neuhaus and others, taken to its logical limits, the absence of 
religion from the public square prefigures a totalitarian state.
156
 
While I outline in depth the baseline arguments for excluding religion as 
detrimental to the democratic processes in Part III below,
157
 given that so much 
of the defense of religion’s role in the legislative process is a response to 
arguments for excluding religion from politics, it is worth briefly noting the 
core objection here. The basis for the desire to exclude religion from the 
political processes is that religious participation uniquely burdens 
non-adherents in political debates.
158
 Religiously based arguments are simply 
inaccessible to non-adherents given that faith, as the word implies, is based on 
a deep and personal comprehensive understanding of the world. Any debate, 
then, is stymied by religious arguments, because faith is undebatable.
159
 If in a 
debate over a hypothetical bill to ban the eating of any animal products, a 
claim is made that “humans should not eat animals because God says that 
 
 152 Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 841 
(1993).  
 153 See supra note 146. 
 154 See NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 27 (arguing that the resulting secularism from a “naked public square” 
is more dangerous to democracy than religion, and taken to its logical limits, the absence of religion from the 
public square prefigures a totalitarian state). 
 155 See id. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See infra Part III.B. 
 158 See especially KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed. 2005); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997). 
 159 See GREENAWALT, supra note 158; Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 16 (1989) 
(arguing for a principle of “conversational restraint”); Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and 
the Obligation of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (1989). 
ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/17/2015 8:41 AM 
1072 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1041 
ingesting the flesh of another animal is inhumane,” it is impossible to engage 
with that perspective. If “God said so,” then the debate is over, at least as far as 
the religious participant is concerned. According to this view, the legislative 
process is obstructed by religious participants—the process depends on debate 
and consensus building, and to the extent that religion is a “conversation 
stopper,” it is in many ways, antidemocratic.
160
 
Defenders of religious participation in the political process reject this claim 
outright. They claim that the idea that religious claims are inaccessible, and 
therefore undemocratic, smacks of secularism.
161
 For these commentators, 
there is no way to distinguish religious-based advocacy for a particular policy 
from a nonreligious perspective, at least in terms of accessibility. Both 
religious and nonreligious arguments for and against legislation suffer from the 
same infirmities as people who have no understanding of the basis of a 
person’s claims. For example, in a debate over climate change, a scientist may 
make a claim that global warming is a scientific fact based on specialized 
scientific data, a religious person might claim that there is no such thing as 
global warming because the Bible says that God will protect the earth, and 
another person might claim that in her hometown, the climate has remained 
steady for twenty-five years. For each of these perspectives, everyone involved 
in the debate can listen to or read about the basis for the arguments.
162
 
Religious arguments, it is claimed, are not uniquely inaccessible. Conversely, 
the value of including the religious perspective in politics is that it enables all 
citizens to participate in the democratic process. 
These two goals of protecting religious liberty and democracy are typically 
proposed by commentators as the reasons why religious participation in 
politics is valuable. The next section considers the unique prowess of religious 
interest groups in implementing these goals. 
 
 160 See RICHARD RORTY, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 168 
(1999); see also William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL 
ANTHOLOGY 96, 102 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000). 
 161 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 142. 
 162 See NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 19 (“Christian truth, if it is true, is public truth. It is accessible to public 
reason.”); McConnell, supra note 2, at 649–51 (characterizing most religious traditions as based on exegesis of 
sources that nonbelievers can study, such as natural law for Catholics and the Bible for fundamentalist 
Protestants); Steven Shiffrin, Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631, 1639 (1999) (arguing 
that nonbelievers can access any source of religious knowledge, including claims of divine inspiration); 
Waldron, supra note 152, at 835–36 (discussing comprehensibility of unfamiliar grounds for argument under 
an Aristotelian conception of public discourse). 
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B. The Success of Religious Interest Groups in Progressing Religious 
Interests 
As Part I explains, religious interest groups actively focus on the goals of 
religious liberty and democratic participation of religious individuals and 
organizations.
163
 Religious interest groups have a long-term commitment to 
advocating for the rights of religious Americans to participate in, and 
influence, the legislative process, channeling these commitments through 
various lobbying efforts. It is valuable, then, to elaborate on how religious 
interest groups are effective in advancing each of these interests. 
1. Religious Interest Groups and Democratic Participation 
In the first instance, religious interest groups are critical to ensuring that 
religious individuals and churches are active participants in the democratic 
process. Religious interest groups have immediate access to a wide 
membership base. This is particularly so in the case of the lobbying arms of 
churches or denominations—such as the Episcopal Church’s Office of 
Government Relations, representing the Episcopalian Church
164
—or 
affiliations of churches or denominations—for example the Jewish Federation 




Generally speaking, the membership of these churches and other 
denominational houses of worship is widespread, diverse, and extensive.
166
 
Surveys put membership in religious institutions at almost 60% of the 
American population.
167
 The presence of a related lobbying group, then, at 
 
 163 See supra Part I.B.  
 164 Episcopal Church, Office of Government Relations Mission Statement, supra note 102. 
 165 About Us: The Jewish Federations of North America’s Washington Office, JEWISH FED’NS N. AM., 
http://www.jewishfederations.org/washington-office.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 166 See, e.g., GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE’S RELIGION: AMERICAN FAITH IN THE 
90’S 16 (1989); HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 71; ROBERT D. PUTNAM, 
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); WILLARD L. SPERRY, 
RELIGION IN AMERICA (1946); David A. Gay & John P. Lynxwiler, Cohort, Spirituality, and Religiosity: A 
Cross-Sectional Comparison, 15 J. RELIGION & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2013, at 1, 7–11, available at 
https://dspace.creighton.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10504/64325/2013-25.pdf. 
 167 See Religion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) 
(noting that in 2014, 59% of respondents indicated they were a “member of a church or synagogue”); see also 
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY: 
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 5–6 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/ 
pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf (noting that only 16.1% of survey respondents indicated that they 
were unaffiliated with a religion). 
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least facially makes American politics more democratic by involving ordinary 
citizens, whose interests on social issues might otherwise go unrepresented, in 
the political process.
168
 That is, individuals who might never have had a voice 
in the political sphere are, by virtue of their membership in a church or other 
denomination represented by a religious interest group, captured into a 
collective and ostensibly given a voice on the political stage.
169
 That religious 
interest groups purport to represent each member of the laity has been 
demonstrated by social scientists and is apparent from a sampling of statements 
of the lobby affiliates of the churches. For example, the Episcopal Church 
affiliate lobby group, the Office of Government Relations, claims to represent 
all Episcopalian voices in policymaking,
170
 and Agudath Israel of America’s 
Office of Government Affairs purports to represent Orthodox Jewish 




More specifically, given that membership in religious institutions is 
dominated by America’s lowest income earners,
172
 the politicization of 
organized religion can enable more citizens outside of the highest income 
earners to participate in politics. As one political scientist notes, “[I]dentifiable 
religious societies are important for interest group theory partially because they 
are by far the largest non-elite group in the nation.”
173
 As the political 
representatives of churches, then, religious interest groups have the potential to 
make lobbyists generally more representative of non-elite and non-monied 
citizens. 
Of course, these high levels of membership do not necessarily equate to 
high levels of participation or influence. In national politics, where money 
buys entry and therefore influence, the combined amount that religious interest 
groups spend on lobbying—$350 million—is only a very small portion of total 
 
 168 See Mihuţ, supra note 1, at 46 (claiming that interest groups “have stimulated the representation of 
various categories of people before the government and have facilitated political participation”). 
 169 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 73–75. 
 170 Episcopal Church, Office of Government Relations Mission Statement, supra note 102. 
 171 Agudath Israel of America, Office of Government Affairs Mission Statement, PEWRESEARCH RELIGION 
& PUB. LIFE PROJECT, http://projects.pewforum.org/religious-advocacy/agudath-israel-of-america-office-of-
government-affairs/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 172 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 12; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 71; JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 60 (1995).  
 173 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also HOFRENNING, supra note 9, 
at 201; Weber & Stanley, supra note 9, at 29.  
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interest group expenditure.
174
 In addition, while membership in churches and 
other denominations is high, because most citizens typically do not join 
religious institutions for political or policy reasons, individual members are 
unlikely to actively participate in any political activities of the institution.
175
 
Instead, most individuals join a religious institution to deepen their faith, meet 
friends, or provide educational opportunities for their children.
176
 Indeed, many 
individuals are unaware that their church has a religious lobbying group 
purporting to represent their interests at all, and some in fact have deep 
objections to political involvement by their church.
177
 A recent Pew Research 
Center poll, for example, notes that more than half of Americans believe that 




Despite this small overall presence in politics in terms of dollars spent, and 
the low levels of active participation of the members, religious interest groups 
remain powerful participants in the democratic process—and ensure that 
religious voices are among the most influential in the legislative process—as a 
consequence of two related factors. 
First, despite the ambivalence of many members of religious institutions to 
the political functions of the affiliated lobby group, the sheer size of many of 
the represented churches and denominations is influential in Washington.
179
 
Even though members might not be actively engaged, the simple fact that 
religious interest groups represent almost 60% the American population 
 
 174 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 14 (estimating that the combined religious group 
expenditure exceeds $350 million annually). In 2013, approximately $3.24 billion was spent on lobbying 
efforts in the United States. See Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ 
index.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 175 See, e.g., Katherine E. Stenger, The Underrepresentation of Liberal Christians: Mobilization 
Strategies of Religious Interest Groups, 42 SOC. SCI. J. 391, 392 (“[L]iberal Christians are underrepresented in 
individual membership-based Christian interest groups.”).  
 176 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 76; see also PUTNAM, supra note 166; ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. 
CAMPBELL WITH SHAYLYN ROMNEY GARRETT, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US 
(2010). 
 177 See, e.g., Roy Beck, National Religious Lobbying, SOC. CONT. J., Spring 1995, at 160, 162, available 
at http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc0503/article_430.shtml (“[M]ost members in their 
local pews have no idea of what lobbying is done on their behalf in Washington.”). 
 178 Michael Lipka, 5 Takeaways About Religion and Politics Before the Midterms, PEW RES. CENTER 
(Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/22/5-takeaways-about-religion-and-politics-
before-the-midterms/. 
 179 But see HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 145–46. 
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provides latent strength to the religious lobbyist.
180
 Politicians are rational 
actors and their behaviors necessarily recognize that responding to religious 
interest groups that represent large voting blocs will result in a higher chance 
of reelection.
181
 To maximize the opportunity for reelection, a legislator will 
necessarily attempt to help those groups that will attract the most votes for the 
legislator.
182
 That is, as a consequence of the number of electors that the 
religious interest groups purportedly represent, government officials, and even 
other lobbyists, may defer to religious interest groups, ensuring the religious 
person some form of participation in the legislative process. 
Second, the subject matter of religious lobbying necessarily ensures at least 
some level of participation in the legislative process. Religion has historic 
salience for the American psyche that holds today.
183
 It is difficult to rebuff 
claims that are based on a principled and moralistic vision of the law, derived 
from the word of God. Consider the rhetorical power in this statement by the 
legislative director of Concerned Women for America: 
The most basic reason for the existence of Concerned Women for 
America is to preserve and protect the traditional American family 
through Judeo-Christian values. We are concerned with those forces 
which tend to weaken the traditional family. . . . We are looking to 
preserve the existing laws that we consider to be compatible with our 
values which are Biblically based and then trying to expose the new 
trends or movements that come along that would make it difficult for 
those who want to hold those values and continue to keep them.
184
 
This prophetic basis for the goods that the religious lobbyist wishes to 
exact from the state is powerful. While standard interest groups rely solely on 
the concerns of their members and institutions for their authority, religious 
interest groups have the additional authority of a tradition of faith.
185
 Religious 
interest groups, then, present demands that have as their basis a higher power, 
 
 180 See Paul A. Djupe & Laura R. Olson, A Meditation on and Meta-analysis of the Public Presence of 
Religious Interests, in RELIGIOUS INTERESTS IN COMMUNITY CONFLICT: BEYOND THE CULTURE WARS 253, 
266 (Paul A. Djupe & Laura R. Olson eds., 2007) (“There is, simply put, an enormous amount of political and 
social capital stored in individuals and organizations with religious ties.”). 
 181 See Robinson, supra note 13, at 149. 
 182 Id. 
 183 GUTTERMAN, supra note 50, at 2–3; MARTIN E. MARTY WITH JONATHAN MOORE, POLITICS, RELIGION, 
AND THE COMMON GOOD: ADVANCING A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN CONVERSATION ABOUT RELIGION’S ROLE IN 
OUR SHARED LIFE 43 (2000); PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 176, at 1. 
 184 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 106 (alteration in original) (quoting Interview by Daniel J.B. 
Hofrenning with Sally White, former Legislative Director, Concerned Women for America (June 1989)). 
 185 See id. 
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rooted in faith principles. Combined with the powerful membership base 
outlined above, the origins of authority for the legislative good sought by the 
lobbyist almost ensures the religious voice a permanent seat at the proverbial 
table, entrenching the religious voice in the democratic process.
186
 
2. Religious Interest Groups and Religious Liberty 
In addition to the prowess of religious interest groups in increasing 
democratic participation of religious Americans, religious interest groups 
increase the substantive religious liberty of those members that they represent. 
To begin, religious interest groups are single-mindedly focused on 
entrenching and protecting the religious liberty of the members that they 
represent. Acting alone, it is difficult for individuals, or even some smaller 
churches, to have their voices heard on the national scene. Having overcome 
collective action problems and the challenges of group formation and 
membership, religious interest groups can reap the benefits of collectively 
pursuing shared religiously driven interests.
187
 For many commentators, the 
existence of diverse and vigorous religious interest groups safeguards 
individual religious liberty.
188
 Religious interest groups, then, act as mediating 
institutions between individuals or churches and the state,
189
 serving to protect 
the liberty interests of an “otherwise powerless individual against the 
bureaucracy and coercion of the powerful modern state.”
190
 
Religious liberty is a subjective ideal; while religious liberty might mean 
preservation of certain privacy rights for one individual or group, it may mean 
the right to government funding for another group. Generally, the idea of 
religious liberty is pursued by religious lobbyists across one of three 
dimensions. First, religious interest groups advocate for protection of discrete 
liberty interests for their members. By this I mean that religious lobbyists 
endeavor to protect the rights of their members to engage in religiously 
 
 186 See generally Robinson, supra note 13. 
 187 On the benefits of collective action, see, for example, MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the 
Evolution of Social Norms, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 137. 
 188 Gedicks, supra note 2, at 118. 
 189 See BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 3. 
 190 Gedicks, supra note 2, at 115. 
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A salient example of this kind of liberty-based lobbying can be seen across 
a number of diverse areas of the law, including the early Quaker lobby and its 
advocacy for exemptions from conscription laws.
192
 With the advent of the 
Civil War came the first national effort to draft men into national service. The 
original conscription bill of 1863 did not mention conscientious objectors, but 
following strong lobbying efforts, an amended bill was proposed that allowed a 
drafted person to pay an equivalent of $300 for a substitute.
193
 Many Quakers 
objected to the payment for a substitute and lobbying again resulted in an 
amendment so that Quakers could serve as noncombatants.
194
 A multitude of 
amendments followed and the conscientious objector provision remains today, 
albeit in a more modern format.
195
 A more modern example of the success of 
religious interest groups in advocating for discrete accommodations from 
generally applicable laws is the success of the Jewish lobby in securing an 
exemption from the Humane Slaughter Act.
196
 Not only did Congress amend 
the bill to include an exemption for ritualistic slaughtering, but it also 
contained a statement that ritualistic slaughtering is “one of the most humane 
methods yet devised.”
197
 The resulting legislation included a statement that the 
 
 191 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-5, at 1169 (2d ed. 1988); Ira C. Lupu, 
The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV 743 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1985); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of 
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992). Ira Lupu notes 
that “accommodation . . . [is] the central motif of religion clause thought.” Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the 
Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 
556 (1991). 
 192 Fisher, supra note 17, at 292–93; Robinson, supra note 13, at 156. 
 193 See Enrollment Act, ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 731, 733 (1863). For the congressional debate over the 
inclusion of an exemption that would satisfy the Quakers and the Shakers, see CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D 
SESS. 994 (1863). 
 194 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9. On conscientious objectors in the civil war, see, for 
example, EDWARD NEEDLES WRIGHT, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE CIVIL WAR (1931).  
 195 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1300.06, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS (2007), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130006p.pdf; see also Mathew B. Tully, Ask the Lawyer: 
Applying for Conscientious Objector Status, MIL. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014, 2:14 PM EST), 
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/benefits/2014/12/22/ask-lawyer-conscientious-
objector/20767753/. 
 196 Pub. L. No. 85-765, § 2(b), 72 Stat. 862, 862 (1958). Louis Fisher notes that at the time of the Act’s 
passage, many companies were following old slaughtering methods of hoisting the animal by a single hind leg, 
and moving it into a “sticker,” who knifed the jugular vein (which would not kill the animal, only cause it to 
bleed), and “knockers,” who swung sledge hammers into the animal’s head. FISHER, supra note 17, at 308. 
 197 104 CONG. REC. 1654 (1958); see also Robinson, supra note 13, at 166. 
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law was in no way intended to “prohibit, abridge, or in any way hinder the 
religious freedom of any person or group.”
198
 
The second dimension across which religious liberty is pursued by 
religious interest groups is collective lobbying for the religious liberty of 
multiple faiths. The best example of this is the collective lobbying efforts of 
nearly all religious interest groups to urge the passage of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
199
 Following a decision of the Supreme 
Court that there were no constitutionally mandated exemptions from generally 
applicable and neutrally expressed laws,
200
 religious interest groups as diverse 
as Americans United, the American Center for Law and Justice, the Christian 
Legal Society, the American Jewish Congress, and the National Association of 
Evangelicals joined together to lobby Congress to pass RFRA.
201
 The results 
were astounding, with RFRA passing the House of Representatives without 
opposition and the Senate with a near unanimous, 97–3 vote.
202
 However, this 
kind of unified pursuit for broad religious liberty is rare.
203
 
The third and final dimension across which religious liberty is pursued by 
lobbyists is the entrenchment of religious ideals into generally applicable law. 
While the pursuit of societal liberty in the image from a specific religious 
perspective has strong historic roots, this type of liberty-enforcing lobbying has 
 
 198 § 6, 72 Stat. at 864. 
 199 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated in part by 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the applicability of the Act to the States and States’ 
subdivisions); see also Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2377 (Nov. 16, 1993). 
 200 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882, 884 (1990) (holding that any special accommodation for 
religious practice is not constitutionally mandated except where a claim that combines a free exercise claim 
and a claim arising from other constitutional provisions—“hybrid” claims—and claims in contexts that “invite 
consideration of the particular circumstances”). For commentary on the “exceptions” to the Smith doctrine, see 
especially 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 80–81 
(2006) (noting that Smith “marks a crucial divide in free exercise law”); Robinson, supra note 13, at 139–40. 
 201 There was broad unification between Democrats, Republicans, the ACLU, Americans United, 
American Center for Law and Justice, the Christian Legal Society, the American Jewish Congress, and the 
National Association of Evangelicals. On this point, see FISHER, supra note 17, at 80; MICHAEL W. 
MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed. 2006). 
 202 The House Judiciary Committee passed the Act unanimously, and the Act cleared the rest of the House 
with the rules suspended (which in turn requires a two-thirds majority). Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law 
Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious-practices.html; see Fisher, supra note 17, at 314–15; 
Robinson, supra note 13, at 142. 
 203 See generally Robinson, supra note 13 (discussing this point in the context of a religious 
organization’s political power). 
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grown exponentially since the late 1970s and early 1980s.
204
 Examples can 
best illuminate this dimension of lobbying for liberty. We can draw on the 
history of religious interest groups outlined in Part I for an early illustration.
205
 
One example is the temperance movement, when churches and groups 
comprised of religious individuals organized to advocate Congress for the 
prohibition of alcohol, a law that would be applicable to all Americans. For 
these lobbyists, “liquor traffic is . . . a crime against God” and “subversive of 
every interest in society,” and to that end, the lobbyists called for “legislation 




A more modern example is the advocacy by religious interest groups for 
the prohibition, or strong restriction, of abortion. Religious interest groups 
including Priests for Life, Texas Right to Life, Concerned Women of America 
for Texas, and Texas Alliance for Life actively pursue the restriction of the 
availability of abortions in America.
207
 The influence that these lobbyists have 
had on legislators, and consequently generally applicable laws, are visible in 
numerous jurisdictions across the country. A key example is in Texas, where, 
on July 18, 2013, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into law legislation that 
severely limits access to abortion.
208
 One of the bill’s sponsors, Representative 
Jodie Laubenberg, commented that the bill was a consequence of “the hand of 
God,”
209
 and another sponsor, Senator Glenn Hegar, stated that the “power of 
 
 204 See supra notes 48–61 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of the religious lobby in 
Washington post-1970). 
 205 See supra Part I.A (discussing the history of religious interest groups). 
 206 ODEGARD, supra note 37, at 38 (quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION, supra 
note 37, at 651); see also FOSTER, supra note 26, at 36, 86, 170; LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, 
at 23. 
 207 See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Texas Governor Rick Perry Signs Bill Banning Late-Term Abortions, 
LIFENEWS.COM (July 18, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/2013/07/18/texas-governor-rick-perry-
signs-bill-banning-late-term-abortions/ (referencing the Priests for Life involvement in the passage of the bill); 
Joan E. Greve, Rick Perry Signs Restrictive Abortion Bill into Law, ABC NEWS (July 18, 2013, 2:28 PM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/rick-perry-signs-restrictive-abortion-bill-into-law/ (referencing 
the involvement of Texas Right to Life, Texas Alliance for Life, Concerned Women for America of Texas, and 
40 Days for Life). 
 208 Act of July 18, 2013, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 5013. For the official report of the signing statement, see 
Governor Rick Perry, Remarks at House Bill 2 Signing (July 18, 2013), available at 
http://governor.state.tx.us/news/speech/18757/. See also Christy Hoppe, Texas Gov. Rick Perry Signs Most 
Restrictive Abortion Law in Nation, DALL. MORNING NEWS (July 18, 2013, 12:29 PM), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/20130718-texas-gov.-rick-perry-signs-most-restrictive-abortion-law-in-
nation.ece; Rick Perry Signs Texas Abortion Bill into Law, BBC NEWS (July 18, 2013, 16:13 ET), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23368980. 
 209 Will Weissert, Gov. Perry Signs Sweeping Abortion Restrictions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 18, 2013, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/18/perry-signs-abortion-regulations/ 
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prayer that day was immense.”
210
 Governor Perry and other speakers at the 
signing ceremony praised the churches that supported the bill.
211
 
All of these lobbying efforts come with tradeoffs. Part III explains how 
religious interest groups’ advocacy for religious liberty can suppress the 
religious liberty of Americans as a whole and potentially affects the democratic 
rights of all citizens. 
III. ASSESSING COSTS: HOW RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS HARM RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY 
The analysis in Part II showed that religious interest groups are beneficial 
for religious individuals and religious institutions in terms of securing the 
participation of religious persons in the legislative process, as well as the 
religious liberty of their members. This Part examines the other side of the 
ledger and claims that despite these benefits, religious interest groups both fail 
to achieve—and may actually repress—the stated goals of democratic 
participation and religious liberty. As I stated above, once we consider the 
costs of religious interest groups alongside the benefits, we can see the deeper 
tensions in the drive for religious liberty and the participatory rights of 
religious persons. 
In demonstrating these adverse effects, this Part draws on claims of 
commentators that religion in politics generally results in negative outcomes 
for both democracy and liberty. To this end, section A outlines the general 
concerns about the presence of religion in the political process for liberty and 
democracy, before sections B and C narrow the focus to consider how the 
pathologies of religious interest groups amplify these general concerns and 
result in specific costs to both democracy and religious liberty. 
 
2551347/; see also Bonnie Pritchett, Abortion Bill Signing Undaunted by Ongoing Protests, S. BAPTIST TEXAN 
(July 22, 2013), http://texanonline.net/archives/4647/. 
 210 David Mildenberg, Perry Signs Abortion Law as Texas Lawmakers Thank God, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 
2013, 2:23 PM EST), http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2013-07-18/texas-abortion-law/. 
 211 Id. A decision regarding the constitutionality of a hotly contested portion of the law, which requires 
any clinic performing abortions to meet stringent medical standards, is expected from the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the coming months. See Carrie Feibel, Texas Abortion Case May Hinge on 
Definition of ‘Undue Burden,’ NPR (Jan. 8, 2015, 12:28 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/ 
2015/01/08/375725066/texas-abortion-case-may-hinge-on-definition-of-undue-burden. 
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A. General Principles: The Danger of Religion and the Need for Constraint 
Religious interest groups present particular immediate dangers for both 
religious liberty and democratic participation. Explaining how religious 
interest groups are especially dangerous for these goals requires a brief 
description of the baseline claim that religion is a dangerous presence in the 
political process that should be constrained. 
Limiting religion in the legislative process—and in politics more 
generally—is typically justified on one of two grounds: first, that religious 
participation undermines the liberty and equality of all citizens; and second, 
that religious participation undermines the democratic process. 
Turning first to the claim that religious arguments in the political process 
harm the liberty and equality of all citizens, the claim is that religious 
argument provides insufficient justification for government action in a diverse 
and pluralistic nation.
212
 Religious argument in public debate, it is claimed, 
urges improper grounds for government action. Proper grounds for government 
action in a liberal democracy exist only when regulatory power is exercised “in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.”
213
 In a modern secular state, 
this reasoning necessarily excludes governmental action based on religion. 
Legislation based on religion is “plausibly seen in some cases as forcing others 
to observe a religious standard.”
214
 Coercion in the form of laws that adhere to 





 212 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 158; JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), 
reprinted in JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION IN FOCUS 12, 17 (John Horton & Susan 
Mendus eds., 1991); RAWLS, supra note 158; Audi, supra note 148; Audi, supra note 159; Rawls, supra note 
158. 
 213 RAWLS, supra note 158, at 217; see also THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 155 (1991) 
(“We must agree to refrain from limiting people’s liberty by state action in the name of values that are deeply 
inadmissible in a certain way from their point of view.”); Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in 
Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 
95, 100 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (positing a conception of justification reflected in an ideal political 
procedure, under which reasonable citizens “aim to defend and criticize institutions and programs in terms of 
considerations that others have reason to accept”); Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public 
Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 742 (1993) (“[R]easons that rely directly on [religious] premises . . . will 
be rejected by many as unreasonable justifications for political action.”). 
 214 AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 142, at 31.  
 215 See Audi, supra note 148, at 690; Audi, supra note 159, at 260–68. 
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In addition, commentators who claim that religion must be excluded from 
politics argue that religion undermines political debate.
216
 This claim stresses 
the dangers inherent within religion. The argument is that while religion has 
well-known social benefits, there is also a “dark side” of religion, one that is 
“inherently intolerant and persecutory.”
217
 For these commentators, religious 
argument has a peculiar capacity to inspire and foster intolerance of opposing 
views.
218
 Politics, then, requires religion to be excluded in order to ensure that 
political debate is not polarized and does not complicate efforts to react 
consensus.
219
 Religion is, as one commentator notes, a “conversation-stopper” 
that prevents the efforts to “keep a democratic political community going.”
220
 
On this view, it is important to place special constraints on religion in the 
legislative process because absent constraint, intolerant religious believers will 
treat the legislative process as a battleground, rather than a forum for public 
debate.
221
 In turn, politics will encourage dangerous divisiveness among 
different religious groups, prompting hate, violence, and persecution.
222
 This 
necessarily results in the undermining of the legislative process and, more 
broadly, the stability of the liberal state. Commentators that take this position 
argue that in light of the potential damage to democracy, religion is best 
removed from politics, in order to “quiet religious fervor.”
223
 Only if religion is 
removed from the legislative process will politics function appropriately.
224
 
With these general concerns about the place of religion in politics in mind, 
the next two sections turn to consider the effect that religious interest groups 
have on the goals of—and relatedly, the concerns about—religious liberty and 
democratic participation. These sections argue that the features of religious 
interest groups—institutional mission, unclear representation, the nature of the 
 
 216 See AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 142, at 31 (claiming that a religious perspective that a 
political opponent is somehow “deficient” can lead to intolerance); GREENAWALT, supra note 158, at 24 
(discussing concerns of democratic instability as a justification for exclusion of religious perspectives); 
Marshall, supra note 160, at 102. 
 217 Marshall, supra note 160, at 102. 
 218 See id. 
 219 See Magarian, supra note 150, at 129; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197–99 (1992) (construing the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses as establishing a 
secular public moral order in order to sustain a religious truce). 
 220 RORTY, supra note 160, at 170–71 (claiming that translation of religious argument removes 
democratically irrelevant rhetoric from political debate). 
 221 See id. 
 222 See id. 
 223 See Marshall, supra note 160, at 106. 
 224 See RORTY, supra note 160; Magarian, supra note 150, at 129–30.  
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lobbying, and the opacity of the groups—combine to amplify the general 
concerns about the effect of religion in politics. To this end, section B will 
discuss the accountability limitations of religious interest groups, as well as the 
potential for the capture of the legislative process by religious interest groups. 
Section C considers the unique danger that religious interest groups pose for 
religious liberty. 
B. Religious Interest Groups and Costs to Democracy 
As noted above, religious interest groups achieve unusual levels of 
participation in the legislative process through their purported representation of 
the religious view of a vast portion of Americans.
225
 This section argues that 
the idea of “the religious viewpoint” is misleading, something that is obscured 
in large part by the opacity of religious lobby groups. This section outlines 
why it is that religious interest groups are imperfect representatives of the 
religious American. It also specifies how the representation concern is difficult 
to overcome as a result of the groups’ limited transparency and therefore 
accountability to the principal the groups claim to represent, as well as the 
political process more generally. 
There are multiple reasons to think that religious interest groups fail to 
represent “the religious viewpoint” in the political process. Core among these 
reasons are four factors that can undercut the democratic gains made by 
religious interest groups that were discussed in the above section. First, not all 
religions engage a religious lobbyist to represent them in the legislative 
process, and among those that do, member engagement is often limited. 
Second, when lobbyists are engaged, positions are taken on issues despite a 
lack of intra-religious agreement, or even consensus. Third, the delegation of 
political representation of a religious viewpoint to lobbyists can result in a drift 
from the original position of the principal. Fourth, the distinctive nature of 
religious lobbying creates a risk of religious group capture of the legislative 
process. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn. 
1. Political Disengagement 
In the first instance, the democratic gains of religious interest groups are 
undercut by the disengagement of the members that the group purports to 
represent. Recall from Part I the two following features of religious interest 
 
 225 See supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the participatory gains of religious interest groups). 
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groups: that many religious interest groups do not represent a preponderance of 
adherents of the represented religion and that it is often difficult to identify 
which—or how many—members know or consider that the religious interest 
group represents them.
226
 For these reasons, religious lobbyists are unlikely to 
reflect the consensus of all adherents to the religious perspective being 
promoted, and often not even a majority. 
Even in those instances where individual members are aware of the 
religious interest group purporting to represent their religious viewpoint in 
politics, it is unlikely that the religious organization requires any member to 
engage in policy decisions.
227
 The majority of the work religious interest 
groups do in the political arena involves communications that are driven by 
senior officials within the primary religious organization or collective that the 
interest group purports to represent.
228
 Examples include letters to officials, 
regulatory comments, input on proposed laws, and day-to-day communications 
with members of Congress.
229
 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 
Report specifies that around nine out of ten religious interest groups contact 
legislators either in person or in writing, using moral and theological 
arguments in the communications.
230
 In addition, around seven out of ten 
groups author policy papers,
231
 more than nine out of ten groups keep their 
constituents informed,
232
 and a growing number hold “lobby days,” where a 
specific religious interest group or coalition of groups bring members to 
Washington, D.C. for a conference, providing training to participants and 
organizing visits to congressional offices.
233
 In all of this, the voice of the 
members is often irrelevant. Elliott Corbett, the former chief lobbyist for the 
United Methodist Church, exemplifies the views of religious lobbyists asking 
“What, in the meantime, would have happened to the prophetic voice of the 





 226 See supra Part I.B.2–3; see also Seifter, supra note 20, at 1001–03.. 
 227 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–15; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 58–60; Bethany Albertson, John 
Brehm & R. Michael Alvarez, Ambivalence as Internal Conflict, in AMBIVALENCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
POLITICAL OPINION 15 (Stephen C. Craig & Michael D. Martinez eds., 2005). 
 228 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–15; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 58–60. 
 229 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 57. 
 230 Id.; see also HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 44–49. 
 231 LOBBYING FOR THE FAITHFUL, supra note 10, at 57–58. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 58–59. 
 234 J. Elliott Corbett, Should the Church Lobby?, ENGAGE, Oct. 15, 1970, at 4, 8. 
ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/17/2015 8:41 AM 
1086 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1041 
Where deep moral issues are involved, the church cannot afford to 
wait for most of its members to agree before it exercises 
leadership. . . . [Church statements] should not be issued after the 
Gallup poll has made it clear they are safe; they should be proclaimed 
as a sort of “advance conscience” of the church.
235
 
In many ways, the disassociation of religious interest groups from their 
member base is similar to what happens in mainstream lobby groups—and the 
standard interest group account predicts that we should expect that members 
will not in fact be engaged in the lobbyists’ decisions.
236
 However, in the 
context of religious interest groups, the issue is not just that religious interest 
groups allow for member disengagement. Instead, given that religious interest 
groups are solicitous of the rights of religious Americans, and indeed reliant on 
the large member base for political traction as well as political legitimacy, it is 
important to recognize that religious interest groups are frequently disengaged 
from their members. 
The nature of this disengagement can differ depending on the nature of the 
member base. For example, members of larger church groups represented by 
the religious interest groups participate less frequently because the capacity for 
involvement and input in the political process is low.
237
 Conversely, where a 
religious lobbyist represents smaller religions or groups of individuals, there 
might be a lack of resources to actively involve members in lobbying efforts.
238
 
There might also be religious institutions and related lobbyists that, though 
they have the resources to engage their members, lack any incentive to do so 
for a variety of reasons.
239
 
Ultimately, regardless of the nature of the member base, what is common 
across all religious interest groups is that it is impossible to know, by looking 
at a position advanced by a religious interest group, how many citizens 
considered the issue. This member disengagement undermines the notion that 
religious interest groups advance a “religious viewpoint.” 
 
 235 Id. at 6, 8. On the strategic choices of religious organizations, see generally FOWLER ET AL., supra note 
55. 
 236 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 114; William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, Economic Models 
of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 512 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups 
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
 237 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 149–54. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
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2. Intra-Religious Dissent 
Second, even among those religious groups and lobbyists that have 
consultative or collective decisionmaking processes, statements that a 
particular religious interest group represents that religion’s viewpoint can 
disguise internal dissent within the religious institution and among the 
members.
240
 This point can be best illustrated with an example. The Leadership 
Conference of Women Religious is a group established to represent nuns in the 
United States.
241
 The group represents over 80% of America’s nuns.
242
 The 
group has refused to publically take a hard line stance on abortion, 
contraception, and ordination of women contrary to the desires of the Vatican’s 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.
243
 That is, a large portion of 
American Catholics have refused to support a specific religious perspective. 
The position of the Leadership Conference of Women is contrary to the views 
espoused and promoted in the political arena by the leading Catholic lobby 
group, the USCCB.
244
 The USCCB has consistently and continuously lobbied 
for restrictions, for example, on a woman’s access to abortions and availability 
of funding of contraceptives.
245
 
The advancement of a religious viewpoint on issues that have deeply 
divided members of a particular religious faith masks the variety of religious 
views on a given issue.
246
 Yet, in many instances, there is no way to detect 
these disagreements on matters of faith. Relatedly, given the opacity under 
which these groups function, it is impossible to say with confidence how 
 
 240 PENNY EDGELL BECKER, CONGREGATIONS IN CONFLICT: CULTURAL MODELS OF LOCAL RELIGIOUS 
LIFE (1999); Nancy L. Eiesland, Irreconcilable Differences: Conflict, Schism, and Religious Restructuring in a 
United Methodist Church, in PENTECOSTAL CURRENTS IN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM 168 (Edith L. 
Blumhofer, Russell P. Spittler & Grant A. Wacker eds., 1999); JAMES L. GUTH ET AL., THE BULLY PULPIT: 
THE POLITICS OF PROTESTANT CLERGY (1997); see also Seifter, supra note 20, at 1003–07 (discussing similar 
themes in a different context). 
 241 See About LCWR, LCWR, https://lcwr.org/about (last visited Mar. 5, 2015); Membership in LCWR, 
LCWR, https://lcwr.org/about/membership (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 242 See About LCWR, supra note 241.  
 243 See, e.g., Mark I. Pinksy, American Nuns Respond to Vatican Rebuke with Conciliatory Statement, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2013, 9:03 AM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/20/catholic-nuns-
vatican-rebuke-us_n_3781683.html.  
 244 See CONGREGATIO PRO DOCTRINA FIDEI [VATICAN CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE 
FAITH], DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT OF LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE OF WOMEN RELIGIOUS (2012), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/upload/Doctrinal_Assessment_Leadership_Conference_Women_Religious.pdf. 
 245 For an overview of the USCCB’s position on abortion and contraceptives, see Abortion, U.S. CONF. 
CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/abortion/ (last visited Mar. 5, 
2015). 
 246 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–15; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 58–60. 
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common these types of divisions are.
247
 However, intuition suggests that at 
least in midsize to large religious organizations, where factionalism tends to 
occur, some level of dissent is common.
248
 Particularly given the nature of 
what is being discussed—matters of faith, conscience, and religion—it’s 
difficult to imagine any religious interest group consistently speaking for all 
members. 
3. Policy and Positional Drift 
The third reason that religious interest groups are imperfectly 
representative of religious viewpoints is that the delegation of the political 
representation of a religious viewpoint to lobbyists can lead to a drift from the 
original position of the principal.
249
 The religious interest group’s staff 
members are the people who are the voice of the religious principal before 
Congress and other government officials. The interests of the lobbyist staff and 
the members may diverge, and the frontline involvement of lobbyists creates 
the risk of positional drift from the intended interests of the principal, 
something that is common in any principal–agent relationship. 
This problem of drift is particularly likely in the context of religious 
interest groups. Political scientists have well-documented the extent to which 
religious lobbyists ignore the views of their members and lobby in an 
oligarchical manner.
250
 As a general matter, groups tend to be oligarchical out 
of organizational necessity and the psychology of group leaders.
251
 This 
matters because in the context of religious groups in particular, members join 
for reasons other than political engagement—namely, religious reasons.
252
 
Most people join church groups, for example, without thinking about the 
church’s related interest group. Indeed, members are often indifferent to the 
lobbying activities of the church leaders and even the fact that there is an 
interest group representing the interests of the church in Washington, caring 
 
 247 See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the opacity of religious interest groups). 
 248 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–15; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 58–60. 
 249 On the concept of policy drift, see especially Seifter, supra note 20, at 1007–09 (discussing policy drift 
in the context of state interest groups in the administrative process). 
 250 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–16; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 150–52; Charles Kurzman, 
Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A Comparative Analysis of Four Religious 
Movements, 3 MOBILIZATION 23, 24–25 (1998). On the concept of oligarchy generally, see JEFFREY A. 
WINTERS, OLIGARCHY (2011). 
 251 WINTERS, supra note 250, at 3–5. 
 252 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 60; see also HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–16. 
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instead about the provision of the selective incentive—theology and faith.
253
 
Because the lobbying of religious interest groups is a byproduct, the link 
between the grassroots religious adherents and the leaders and lobbying staff is 
severed. The result is an internal oligarchy that functions independent of 
member decisionmaking. 
A salient example evidencing oligarchy in religious interest groups is the 
antiwar position taken by many religious lobbyists in the early days of the 
Vietnam War, when the war was popular.
254
 Groups such as the National 
Council of Churches, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and the 
World Council of Churches all provided early antiwar statements and lobbied 
Congress for American withdrawal from Vietnam. These lobbying efforts were 
without member support, leading one commentator to conclude that religious 
interest groups were “generals without armies.”
255
 
In addition, the specific nature of religious lobbying tends to lead to 
religious leaders justifying nondemocratic decisions in theological terms, 
claiming that their job is to “discern God’s will” and not the interests of 
members.
256
 A critical problem emerges when lobbyists and church leaders 
guiding the actions of a religious interest group are faced with different 
interpretations about the will of God. In these circumstances, while 
occasionally the organizations might resort to member processes to resolve a 
dispute, typically the views of church leaders are relied upon, even in the face 
of member disagreement.
257
 This drift from the broader religious membership 
significantly undermines the democratic gains of religious interest groups. 
4. Legislative Capture 
Finally, while interest-group lobbying always creates a risk of capturing the 
legislative process—that is, having an “outsized influence” on the political 
 
 253 See Jon A. Shields, Between Passion and Deliberation: The Christian Right and Democratic Ideals, 
122 POL. SCI. Q. 89, 97, 103 (2007). 
 254 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 152. 
 255 JAMES L. ADAMS, THE GROWING CHURCH LOBBY IN WASHINGTON 244 (1970). 
 256 HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 60 (internal quotation mark omitted); see also FOSTER, supra note 26; 
RICHARD J. GELM, POLITICS AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY: AMERICAN CATHOLICS SINCE THE SECOND VATICAN 
COUNCIL (1994); Paul A. Djupe, Laura R. Olson & Christopher P. Gilbert, Sources of Clergy Support for 
Denominational Lobbying in Washington, 47 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 86 (2005). 
 257 HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 14–16; HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 61.  
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process—religious interest groups create particular risks of capture.
258
 As 
described in Part I, the nature of religious lobbying tends to differ from 
standard mainstream lobbying in that the only acceptable policy outcome is the 
ideal policy outcome.
259
 Recall that under a standard account of interest group 
politics, interest groups form and generate pressure on the state.
260
 In turn, the 
different interests pressure the state to find a compromise that is acceptable to 
all groups—an acceptable policy outcome.
261
 This conception of interest group 
politics does little to damage the democratic process—in fact, on the contrary, 
it can be seen as democracy enforcing, where diverse interests debate 
important issue in politics and come to a mutual agreement as to the remedy. 
The peculiar nature of religious lobbying, where compromise on the ideal 
policy position is an unacceptable outcome, means that while organized 
religious interests might work to exert pressure in the classic pluralist sense, 
their radical expectations change the nature of the legislative process.
262
 As 
such, the legislative process is not a debate where parties sort through their 
preferences to reach a consensus-based compromise.
263
 Rather, religious 
interest groups tend to proceed on the premise that certain public policies are 
fundamentally erroneous, and a compromise solution to those errors is 
unacceptable. Because of this, the legislative process becomes a venue where 
the strongest, most dominant interest seeks to exert control over the process for 
the purpose of controlling the outcome.
264
 
This refusal to compromise means that the policy process is not a reflection 
of the balance of community interests. Instead, the process becomes 
winner-take-all, where the ideas of bargaining and compromise have little, if 
any, salience.
265
 The concern of capture of the legislative process on issues that 
religious interest groups are involved, then, can be clearly seen when religious 
interest groups lobby. The inability of religious interest groups to negotiate, 
debate, and compromise on the outcome because of their religious mandate is 
 
 258 Seifter, supra note 20, at 1009–11; see also PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST 
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (providing a recent 
contribution to the scholarly dialogue on capture).  
 259 See supra Part I.B.4. 
 260 See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 261 See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 262 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 52–53; Lowi, supra note 114. 
 263 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 52–53; Lowi, supra note 114. 
 264 See HERTZKE, supra note 9, at 74–76. Hertzke cites an interview with Gretchen Eick of the United 
Church of Christ, where she states “we are concerned about winning, not witnessing.” Id. at 75 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 265 See HOFRENNING, supra note 9, at 117–21. 
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precisely the concern that animates commentators to push for exclusion of 
religion in politics as a general matter.
266
 The goal of the democratic process is 
that all citizens be able to discuss an issue in a way that is understandable and 
debatable by all members of the political community.
267
 With their prophetic 
mandate and vision, religious interest groups’ fundamental commitment to 
their desired goal, combined with the powerful force of the large potential 
voter base, undermines the democratic process. 
The problem of capture is compounded by both the opacity of religious 
interest groups and the subject of the lobbying—religion. While the opacity of 
religious interest groups stymies any exploration of how religious interest 
groups function in the political process, the fact that religious lobbyists are 
representative of the religious voice in the political process necessarily 
discourages skeptical analysis of the role and function of religious interest 
groups in the political process. These features of religious interest groups 
combine to create a situation of deep concern where the legislative process 
itself is captured by religious interest groups. 
C. Religious Interest Groups and Costs to Religious Liberty 
In addition to democratic concerns raised by the presence of religious 
interest groups in politics, there also exists potential for serious harm to 
religious liberty. While Part II outlined the success of religious interest groups 
in ensuring the religious liberty of its members to believe and act on their 
faith,
268
 this section claims that any success of religious interest groups’ 
lobbying practices cuts against the religious liberty of the population more 
generally. This section argues that rather than being an embodiment of 
religious liberty, the inclusion of religious interest groups in the legislative 
process results in very serious harm to the religious liberty of all Americans. 
Focusing on harm to liberty caused by religious interest groups requires us 
to rotate the flashlight ever so slightly from the process concerns outlined 
above (i.e., the role of religion in political debate), to recognizing the impact of 
religion on the outcomes of the debate (i.e., the resulting laws). The regulation 
resulting from religious persuasion in the legislative process is infrequently 
recognized by commentators. This is an error. As outlined in Part I, proponents 
of religious speech in politics are not simply claiming a symbolic role for 
 
 266 See supra Part III.A. 
 267 See supra Part III.A. 
 268 See supra Part II.B. 
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religion, whereby the religious citizen is permitted to have a voice.
269
 Religious 
speech is not passive; it does not merely provide a foil for the secular 
perspective in political debate. Instead, in speaking from a religious 
perspective, religious citizens—individuals or groups—seek to influence the 
political outcomes. 
For many religious citizens engaged in the political process, the goal is to 
ensure religious liberty through accommodations from generally applicable 
laws. For these citizens, religious liberty is satisfied by freedom from the state. 
For others, however, religious liberty is only satisfied by ensuring the policies 
of the state reflect their religious perspective in generally applicable law. That 
is, in arguing for a particular policy, these citizens seek to entrench their 
religious perspective as law.
270
 Recall the example of the Texas law severely 
restricting access to abortions, overtly acknowledged to be a faith-driven 
outcome.
271
 Those religious interest groups that lobbied for the restrictions on 
a woman’s access to abortion were not simply interested in having a voice in 
the debate. Their goal, like that of mainstream lobbyists, was to influence the 
outcome. 
In the traditional account of the legislative process, the law can be 
understood as a system of impartial rules, serving as a framework within which 
individuals and groups may pursue their own divergent and independently 
defined conceptions of what constitutes the good life.
272
 Under this view, the 
power of the law is in its hands-off approach to individual determinations of 
morality and decisionmaking on difficult moral questions. What this simple 
view of the law’s purpose misses, however, is precisely what religious interest 
groups grasp: that the law is less hands-off in practice than in theory and has a 
deeply constitutive role that can work to transform the boundaries of the state 
in the image of a particular religious tradition. In other words, not only do 
religious speakers want a voice in the political process, in many instances they 
want to transform the law in their image. 
What is wrong with well-mobilized religious interest groups shaping the 
law and the boundaries of individual choice in our political community? After 
all, mainstream interest groups arguably do precisely that when they lobby for 
a legal or regulatory change that impinges on others’ daily choices. The answer 
 
 269 See supra Part I.B.4. 
 270 See Lowi, supra note 114.  
 271 See supra notes 207–11. 
 272 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 160. 
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lies again in the nature of the advocacy of religious interest groups. Recall the 
goal of religious interest groups outlined above: religious interest groups seek 
to change social policy to reflect a particular religious perspective.
273
 When we 
focus on the lobbying outcomes—that is, what happens when the religious 
lobbying is successful—we can see the burden that radical lobbying places on 
non-adherents. Transformative law that enshrines a specific religious 
perspective of the powerful and well-mobilized not only gives power to the 
religious-group lobbying for the outcome, but importantly it isolates and 
marginalizes the religious perspectives of the non-adherents by transforming 
one specific religion into law. This is the essence of a burden on conscience. 
Recall from Part II that proponents of religious argument in politics 
typically claim that excluding religious citizens from the political process 
would be a violation of the religious citizens’ religious liberty, therefore 
inclusion is critical to religious liberty.
274
 Commentators argue that it would be 
a violation of the very terms of equal citizenship that the democratic polity is 
designed to guard to exclude religious Americans and, relatedly, religious 
interest groups.
275
 The problem is that allowing these kinds of transformative 
policies in the name of religious liberty—where the law enshrines a particular 
religious perspective—necessarily violates the conscience and religious liberty 
of the whole political community. Unlike religious advocacy for an 
accommodation from a generally applicable law—for example, exempting 
slaughterhouses, which operate according to the laws of kashrut, from 
regulations—the consequence of transformative laws is that we are all bound 
to adhere to them.
276
 Return again to the example of the Texas abortion bill, 
passed in large part as a result of religious lobbying efforts.
277
 The stringent 
abortion restrictions reflect a particular conservative religious perspective 
about the origins of life that has its roots in a specific reading of the bible. This 
religiously driven, religion-based law obliges all Texas citizens to comply with 
a particular faith-based perspective, whether they adhere to that faith or not. 
 
 273 See Part I.B.4 (describing the distinctive lobbying style of religious interest groups). 
 274 See Part II.A (stating the goals of including religious views in politics). 
 275 McConnell, supra note 2, at 656; see also Jonah Perlin, Note, Religion as a Conversation Starter: 
What Liberal Religious Political Advocates Add to the Debate About Religion’s Place in Legal and Political 
Discourse, 100 GEO. L.J. 331, 340 (2011). 
 276 Although the focus of this Article is on lobbying that results in entrenchment of religious views in 
generally applicable laws, there might also be concern that lobbying for accommodations from generally 
applicable laws raises similar, although potentially less intense, concerns. 
 277 See supra notes 207–11. 
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Thus, while the religious liberty of the specific citizen whose religious 
liberty has been entrenched in the general law has been respected, the 
conscience of those citizens that do not share the worldview of the well-funded 
and politically mobilized religious group has been violated. The often radical 
and transformative politics of religious interest groups results in a captured 
state that, over time, becomes far from liberal, and instead is the very essence 
of illiberality. 
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: BALANCING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RELIGIOUS 
INTEREST GROUPS IN FEDERAL POLITICS 
As the previous Parts have attempted to demonstrate, once we attend to the 
grassroots question of how religious voices participate in the political 
process—through the medium of religious interest groups—the picture of 
unmitigated benefits for religious liberty and the democratic process becomes 
complicated. Accounting for religious interest groups, we can see that these 
goals are, ironically, compromised due to the nature of the groups and their 
manner of functioning. This means that some balancing is necessary, and some 
tradeoffs may have to be made: if the best way of advancing religious liberty 
and democratic participation in fact disserves religious liberty and democratic 
participation, we must calibrate the role of religious interest groups in the 
legislative process. 
In order to more precisely identify the interests that must be balanced when 
working toward the goal of ensuring religious liberty and democracy, it is 
beneficial to recall the prowess of religious interest groups in advancing the 
goals of religious liberty and democracy outlined in Part II.
278
 Recall that 
religious interest groups institutionalize long-term commitments to advocate 
for religious liberty and democratic participation.
279
 Religious interest groups 
offer a focus on the religious interest (however defined in the terms of any 
given faith), advancing that interest in the legislative process for the benefit of 
the wide and often underrepresented member base. But these benefits come at 
a cost: representation of a single religious view, defined by high-ranking 
church members, can limit the information conveyed about the religious 
perspective.
280
 And the insulation of religious lobbyists from the religious 
 
 278 See supra Part II (discussing the prowess of religious interest groups in advancing the goals of 
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 279 See supra Part II.B. 
 280 See supra Part III.B (discussing the costs of religious interest groups on democratic participation). 
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adherents, as well as the general population, makes them opaque and 
unaccountable in the political process.
281
 
Yet, reforming the legislative process to account for the particular concerns 
of religious interest groups could potentially impede the religious liberty and 
democratic gains that religious interest groups have achieved. Consider what 
would happen if reforms focused on protecting the religious liberty of the 
non-adherents to the religious lobbyists’ agenda. A potent reform might 
attempt to exclude religious interest groups from the legislative process as a 
general matter, justifying it on the ground that the free exercise of a 
non-adherent’s religion will always be violated by the presence of legislation 
motivated by religious lobbying efforts. While this type of reform would 
protect the non-adherents, it would potentially undermine the religious 
freedom of the represented faith, and unfairly single out religion for 
restrictions in the political process.
282
 
With these tradeoffs in view, this Part proceeds to outline some possible 
reforms that take account of the competing interests. As stated above, this 
Article has proceeded on the assumption that the goals of religious liberty and 
democratic participation have value. 
The challenge therefore becomes finding a balance between the costs and 
benefits of religious interest groups’ participation in the political process for 
the goals of religious liberty and democratic participation—one that increases 
transparency about, and accountability of, the groups’ advocacy platforms and 
behaviors, yet militates against burdens on the religious liberty of 
non-adherents, without disturbing the groups’ liberty and democratic gains. 
What follows is a brief outline of possible directions for reform, all of which 
require subsequent development and balancing against constitutional 
considerations. 
A. Religious Interest Groups and Their Members 
The first possible locus for reform is the religious interest groups 
themselves, or the religious traditions that they represent. With that said, it is 
unlikely that either the religious institutions or their representative religious 
 
 281 See supra Part I.B.3. 
 282 See, e.g., Nina J. Crimm & Laurence H. Winer, Tax Law Bans on Political Campaign Speech by 
Houses of Worship: Inappropriate Government Censorship and Intrusion on Religion, 2 J.L. RELIGION & ST. 
101, 106 (2013). See generally NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: 
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interest groups will be the primary driver behind reforms, as neither have any 
incentive to deviate from the status quo.
283
 
Yet, as the existence and role of religious interest groups are more readily 
apparent—and the sometimes deleterious effects of religious lobbyists on the 
goals of religious liberty and democratic participation become known—it is 
plausible to think that the groups and their principals might advance changes 
on their own accord. At a minimum, religious interest groups can disclose their 
lobbying efforts, as well as the specific policies being lobbied for, to their 
broader membership. This would go some way toward alleviating the 
accountability concerns outlined in Part III above.
284
 Religious interest groups 
could also go further, and voluntarily disseminate their membership and 
funding information, along with their lobbying platforms and strategies, to the 
general public via their websites. 
This kind of voluntary disclosure is not unprecedented. Recall the 
voluntary disclosure of lobbying spending and reporting of advocacy efforts by 
the Friends Committee on National Legislation above in Part I.
285
 This 
reporting also benefits the public at large and legislators by informing them of 
the actions being taken in the name of any given religious institution or issues 
group. In addition, this kind of voluntary reporting has the benefit of informing 
the grassroots members of the actions that are being taken in their names, 
possibly increasing member engagement and thereby increasing the 
representativeness of the interest group, decreasing drift, and limiting the 
potential of oligarchical lobbying. 
B. Judicial Reform 
There is a possibility that courts could play a role in mitigating any 
deleterious effects on religious liberty and democratic participation of religious 
interest groups via the Establishment Clause.
286
 That is, any individual or 
group that feels aggrieved by legislation that is underscored by religious 
doctrine could bring a claim that the legislation violated the Establishment 
Clause. Thinking about the consequences of religious-interest-group lobbying 
that are of most concern—where the religious interest group entrenches a 
 
 283 See supra Part I.B (discussing the features and structure of religious interest groups). 
 284 See supra Part III. 
 285 See Seifter, supra note 20, at 1022 (discussing voluntary disclosures in the states-as-lobbyists context); 
supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 286 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
ROBINSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/17/2015 8:41 AM 
2015] LOBBYING IN THE SHADOWS 1097 
faith-based doctrine in the generally applicable law—there is at least a 
plausible claim that the Establishment Clause will be responsive to this claim. 
However, in light of the Court’s trajectory in Establishment Clause cases and 
the narrow reading of the relevant constitutional standard, arguably the Court 
is unlikely to employ the Establishment Clause to respond to claims of 
religious entrenchment in general law.
287
 
Under the Court’s current doctrine, litigants bringing a claim pursuant to 
the Establishment Clause must claim either that the government is favoring one 
religious sect over another,
288
 or that the government is benefiting one religion 
by, for example, requiring or permitting prayer in public schools or permitting 
religious symbols in the public square.
289
 In the case of entrenchment of 
religious faith in generally applicable law, there is at least a colorable claim 
that the government is benefiting one religion over another. As the Court held 
in the leading case of Larson v. Valente, “The clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially 
preferred over another.”
290
 Equally, there is a facial claim that these kinds of 
laws benefit one religion, with its intangible, and often tangible, support for the 
faith in question. 
The problem, however, is that under either of these causes of action, the 
Court will engage in a form of balancing analysis, and its jurisprudence 
suggests that the balancing will favor the government. For instance, if the law 
is held to prefer one religion over another, strict scrutiny will apply.
291
 In the 
Religion Clause context, strict scrutiny has been referred to as “strict in theory 
but feeble in fact,”
292
 with the Court frequently finding that the claimant’s 
religion was not burdened, or that the government had demonstrated a 
 
 287 But see Gey, supra note 25 (arguing that limits on religious speech are consistent with current Speech 
Clause doctrine). 
 288 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
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 290 Larson, 456 U.S. at 244. 
 291 Id. at 246. 
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compelling (secular) interest for the law.
293
 Equally, under the Court’s 
preferential treatment jurisprudence, where the Court has applied various tests 
to assess the validity of the law,
294
 cutting against a judicial remedy is the fact 
that the Court has tended to find that a facial secular motive is sufficient to 
save the constitutionality of a law that might favor one particular religion.
295
 
Relying on the judiciary as a deliberate choice for controlling religious interest 
group behavior, then, is inadvisable. 
C. Political Reform 
The political branches of government are most likely to be the driver of any 
reform given the likely incapacity of the courts—and the likely unwillingness 
of the religious interest groups—to address the countervailing burdens imposed 
by religious lobbying. Given that exclusion of religious interest groups from 
the legislative process is both normatively and politically unpalatable, I suggest 
here that there are two plausible options for politically driven institutional 
constraints on religious lobbyists. 
First, there is the possibility of more stringent policing of the limits on 
lobbying permitted for organizations exempt under the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act.
296
 Recall from Part I that pursuant to the LDA, churches and related 
auxiliaries, associations of churches and their auxiliaries, or religious orders 
that are exempt under the Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) from filing a 
federal income tax return are exempt from the disclosure requirements of the 
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LDA.
297
 Pursuant to § 501(c)(3), these exempt religious institutions are limited 
in the amount of lobbying that they can do without jeopardizing their 
tax-exempt status.
298
 Specifically, religious institutions will only maintain their 
exempt status if “no substantial part of the activities [of the religious institution 
include] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation.”
299
 Any institutions found to have engaged in prohibited lobbying 
efforts will lose their tax-exempt status and, relatedly, their exempt status 
under the LDA.
300
 One possibility for political reform, then, is heightened 
policing of the lobbying efforts of religious institutions by the IRS. 
This political reform is plausible, but has a number of potential flaws. First, 
there are restraints on the IRS’s auditing of churches, the auspices of which the 
related lobbying affiliates fall under for IRS purposes. Specifically, the Church 
Audit Procedures Act, located in § 7611 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
stipulates that only “an appropriate high-level Treasury official” can initiate an 
investigation into a church’s tax compliance.
301
 A high-level tax official is 
defined as “the Secretary of the Treasury or any delegate of the Secretary 
whose rank is no lower than that of a principal Internal Revenue officer for an 
internal revenue region.”
302
 Investigating churches, then, poses significant 
administrative burdens on one government agency. 
In addition, even if investigations are launched there still remains a discrete 
problem that makes this reform suboptimal. Specifically for interest groups 
representing religious denominations, many groups will not run afoul of the 
Internal Revenue Code requirement that lobbying activities not comprise a 
“substantial” portion of the denomination’s activities, even when they engage 
in what appears to be significant lobbying efforts.
303
 While neither the Court 
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nor Congress has defined what constitutes “substantial” lobbying for any 
organization, most tax lawyers assume that it refers to a portion of the 
organization’s resources.
304
 The problem with this measure is that it fails to 
capture the larger groups. Take, for example, the Mormon Church’s 
multimillion dollar lobbying efforts in support of Proposition 8: observers 
suggested that even the estimated $10 million in expenditures on lobbying was 
a small fraction of the Church’s annual revenues and therefore were not 
“substantial.”
305
 In other words, even if the IRS heightens their policing efforts 
of the activities of religious institutions, the current regulations simply do not 
reach so far as to capture all of the parties that we might be concerned about. 
Second, there is the possibility of legislative amendment of the current 
controls on lobbying disclosure requirements, specifically removing 
exemptions for religious organizations from the Lobbying Disclosure Act. 
Doing so would ensure greater transparency of religious interest groups and 
accountability of those groups to both members and the public at large. To be 
sure, the LDA is not a particularly robust tool for ensuring the accountability 
of interest groups.
306
 Scholars have consistently argued that the LDA 
requirements fail to capture important information of significant relevance to 
public knowledge of the power of private interests in the political process.
307
 
However, in the interests of neutrality and in light of general unwillingness to 
single out religious interest groups for special exclusion from the legislative 
process, removing the exemption would at least bring religious interest group 
disclosures in line with all other lobbyists. 
The most significant obstacle to the implementation of this reform is, 
ironically, precisely the reason the reform is necessary in the first place: the 
power of religious interest groups. As rational actors, legislators are 
necessarily disincentivized from enacting these reforms.
308
 Legislators are 
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benefit maximizers, interested predominantly in their own political survival 
(i.e., reelection).
309
 Legislative actions, then, are the result of a subtle and 
complex process through which the gains derived from any legislative action 
(votes gained) are weighed against the costs of the action (votes lost).
310
 When 
we focus on religious interest groups, the possibility of reforming the LDA to 
exclude religious interest groups seems tenuous. As noted in Part I, religious 
interest groups have a strong presence and influence in Washington, in large 
part because of the large member base that they can potentially call on to 
respond to legislator action or inaction contrary to their beliefs on an issue.
311
 
At least facially, it seems a challenging proposition to expect the legislature to 
be responsive in the face of likely religious interest group opposition. Future 
work should, however, continue to explore the role of the political branches of 
government in constraining religious interest groups’ behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
While the advent of the new religious institutionalism has pushed questions 
over the role of the appropriate relationship between religion and the state to 
the foreground, commentators have thus far failed to address how the religion–
state relationship functions. This Article has sought to expose the overlooked 
question of institutional design in the religion–state relationship. By 
illuminating and analyzing the role of the prime instigator of religious 
involvement in political life—religious interest groups—this Article reveals 
that religious involvement in the political process is more complex than 
previously thought. Religious interest groups are a structural presence in the 
federal legislative process, and understanding their function and impact is 
critical to any complete account of the role of religion in politics and public 
life. 
What this Article reveals is that while religious involvement in politics is 
generally claimed to support core constitutional goals of democratic 
participation and religious liberty, the features of these groups result in far 
more complicated outcomes for these underlying values. While contemporary 
popular and scholarly discourse generally praises the involvement of religion 
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in the legislative process as serving the goals of religious liberty and 
democratic participation, once we bring religious interest groups into view we 
can see that the presence of religion in the legislative process can sometimes 
compromise religious liberty and democracy. This Article argues that these 
mixed results mean that rather than according unmitigated praise to religion in 
public life, it is essential to rethink the role of religious interest groups in 
politics in order to appropriately balance the competing outcomes for religious 
liberty and democracy. By outlining some possible directions for reform that 
attempt to account for these mixed results, this Article seeks to start a new 
conversation about the institutional design of religious participation in the 
legislative process. Ultimately, this Article concludes that, going forward, 
discussions of religious involvement in political life should attempt to balance 
both what is gained and lost though the entrenched presence of religious 
interest groups in the legislative process. 
 
